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Abstract

The U.S. military’s increasing reliance on commercial and military
communications satellites to enable widely-dispersed, mobile forces to communicate
makes these space assets increasingly vulnerable to attack by adversaries. Attacks on
these satellites could cause military communications to become unavailable at critical
moments during a conflict. This research dissected a typical satellite communications
system in order to provide an understanding of the possible attacker entry points into the
system, to determine the vulnerabilities associated with each of these access points, and
to analyze the possible impacts of these vulnerabilities to U.S. military operations. By
understanding these vulnerabilities of U.S. communications satellite systems, methods
can be developed to mitigate these threats and protect future systems.
This research concluded that the satellite antenna is the most vulnerable
component of the satellite communications system’s space segment. The antenna makes
the satellite vulnerable to intentional attacks such as: RF jamming, spoofing, meaconing,
and deliberate physical attack. The most vulnerable Earth segment component was found
to be the Earth station network, which incorporates both Earth station and NOC
vulnerabilities. Earth segment vulnerabilities include RF jamming, deliberate physical
attack, and Internet connection vulnerabilities. The most vulnerable user segment
components were found to be the SSPs and PoPs. SSPs are subject to the vulnerabilities
of the services offered, the vulnerabilities of Internet connectivity, and the vulnerabilities
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associated with operating the VSAT central hub. PoPs are susceptible to the
vulnerabilities of the PoP routers, the vulnerabilities of Internet and Intranet connectivity,
and the vulnerabilities associated with cellular network access.

v

Acknowledgments

I would like to sincerely thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Richard Raines, for his
guidance and support throughout my thesis research effort. Thank you for your patience
as I struggled my way through the process. Also, I truly appreciated your willingness to
accommodate my work schedule when I started at AFIT as a part-time student. In
addition, I would like to thank Major Paul Harmer from the USSTRATCOM, Joint
Information Operations Warfare Command, Joint Electronic Warfare Center,
Vulnerability Assessment Branch for helping me to narrow the focus of my project and
providing some very useful sources of information. I would also like to express my
sincere gratitude to Mr. Scott Anderson from SEAKR Engineering for his help and
willingness to provide me with information on the IRIS project.
I owe a sincere debt of gratitude to the folks at NASIC who enabled me to come
to AFIT as a full-time student through the LTFT program. Thank you for this
opportunity. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their support
throughout this endeavor. I appreciate you pushing me to finish my thesis on time to
graduate. It would be a difficult feat to accomplish while working full-time.

vi

Table of Contents
Page
Abstract..........................................................................................................................iv
Acknowledgments..........................................................................................................vi
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. x
List of Tables ................................................................................................................xii
List of Acronyms .........................................................................................................xiii
I: Introduction .................................................................................................................1
II: Background ...............................................................................................................4
2.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 4
2.2 History of INTELSAT and INTELSAT Satellite Capacity..................................... 5
2.3 Satellite Access Points........................................................................................... 9
2.3.1 INTELSAT Standard A...................................................................................9
2.3.2 INTELSAT Standard B.................................................................................10
2.3.3 INTELSAT Standard C.................................................................................10
2.3.4 INTELSAT Standard D.................................................................................11
2.3.5 INTELSAT Standards E and F ......................................................................11
2.3.6 INTELSAT Standard G.................................................................................12
2.3.7 INTELSAT Standards H and K.....................................................................12
2.3.8 INTELSAT Services .....................................................................................12
2.3.9 Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) .....................................................13
2.4 Multiple Access Methods .................................................................................... 18
2.4.1 FDMA ..........................................................................................................19
2.4.2 SCPC............................................................................................................20
2.4.3 MCPC...........................................................................................................20
2.4.4 DAMA..........................................................................................................20
2.4.5 SCPC Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) Multiple Access Demand Assignment
Equipment (SPADE) .............................................................................................21
2.4.6 TDMA ..........................................................................................................21
2.4.7 SS/TDMA.....................................................................................................23
2.4.8 CDMA..........................................................................................................23
2.5 Emerging and Proposed Systems ......................................................................... 24
2.5.1 Internet Routing in Space (IRIS) ...................................................................24
2.6 Hacking Satellite Communications Links ............................................................ 26
2.6.1 Tamil Tigers Liberation Front .......................................................................26
2.6.2 TLS NexGen Interference Locating System ..................................................27
2.6.3 Falun Gong ...................................................................................................28
2.6.4 Other Jamming Events ..................................................................................28
2.6.5 Conclusions ..................................................................................................28
vii

2.7 Summary ............................................................................................................. 30
III: Methodology........................................................................................................... 31
3.1 Introduction......................................................................................................... 31
3.2 Satellite ............................................................................................................... 31
3.2.1 Satellite Access Router .................................................................................33
3.2.2 Transponders ................................................................................................34
3.2.3 TWTAs.........................................................................................................36
3.3 Earth Station........................................................................................................ 36
3.3.1 VSAT Data Reception...................................................................................38
3.3.2 Earth Station Network...................................................................................38
3.4 Network Operations Center (NOC)...................................................................... 39
3.4.1 NOC Access Router......................................................................................40
3.4.2 Fiber Network...............................................................................................40
3.5 User Terminals .................................................................................................... 42
3.5.1 Wireless Network Adapter ............................................................................43
3.5.2 Points-of-Presence (PoPs) .............................................................................43
3.5.3 Standard PC Devices.....................................................................................45
3.6 Summary ............................................................................................................. 46
IV: Results .................................................................................................................... 47
4.1 Introduction......................................................................................................... 47
4.2 Space Segment Vulnerabilities............................................................................. 47
4.2.1 Satellite Antenna Vulnerabilities ...................................................................48
4.2.2 Transponder Vulnerabilities ..........................................................................57
4.2.3 TWTA Vulnerabilities ..................................................................................59
4.2.4 Satellite Access Router Vulnerabilities..........................................................60
4.2.5 Space Segment Vulnerabilities Summary ......................................................61
4.3 Earth Segment Vulnerabilities ............................................................................. 62
4.3.1 Earth Station Antenna Vulnerabilities ...........................................................62
4.3.2 VSAT Central Hub Vulnerabilities................................................................66
4.3.3 Earth Station Network Vulnerabilities ...........................................................68
4.3.4 Network Access Point Vulnerabilities ...........................................................70
4.3.5 Wireless Network Adapter Vulnerabilities ....................................................71
4.3.6 NOC Internet Connection Vulnerabilities......................................................72
4.3.7 NOC Connection to Terrestrial Fiber Network Vulnerabilities ......................73
4.3.8 NOC Access Router Vulnerabilities ..............................................................75
4.3.9 Earth Segment Vulnerabilities Summary.......................................................80
4.4 User Segment Vulnerabilities .............................................................................. 80
4.4.1 Cellular Network Access Vulnerabilities.......................................................81
4.4.2 Satellite Service Provider (SSP) Connection Vulnerabilities..........................85
4.4.3 Point-of-Presence (PoP) Connection Vulnerabilities......................................92
4.4.4 Standard PC Device Connection Vulnerabilities............................................95
4.4.5 User Segment Vulnerabilities Summary........................................................95
4.5 Attacking INTELSAT 14 and the IRIS Payload................................................... 96

viii

V: Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work........................................................ 101
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 105
Vita ............................................................................................................................. 122

ix

List of Figures
Figure

Page

Figure 1. VSAT Network - Star Configuration .............................................................14
Figure 2. VSAT Network - Mesh Configuration ...........................................................15
Figure 3. VSAT Network - Hybrid Configuration.........................................................18
Figure 4. Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM) Illustration ....................................19
Figure 5. Time Division Multiplexing Illustration.........................................................22
Figure 6. Satellite Breakdown Showing Access Point Components.................................1
Figure 7. IRIS Payload Diagram...................................................................................34
Figure 8. IRIS Access Router Configuration.................................................................34
Figure 9. Basic Structure of a Bent-Pipe Satellite Transponder .....................................35
Figure 10. Earth Station Breakdown Showing Access Point Components .....................37
Figure 11. Network Operations Center Breakdown Showing Access Point Components
..............................................................................................................................39
Figure 12. Fiber Network Breakdown of Access Points ................................................41
Figure 13. User Terminals Breakdown Showing Access Point Components .................43
Figure 14. Points-of-Presence Access Points Breakdown..............................................44
Figure 15. Antenna Side Lobe Interference Illustration ................................................49
Figure 16. Typical Antenna Beam Pattern ...................................................................50
Figure 17. Sun Outage Illustration ................................................................................51
Figure 18. Multipath Signal Fading Illustration.............................................................53
Figure 19. Spoofing Vulnerability Illustration...............................................................56
Figure 20. Radio Frequency Interference Illustration ....................................................65

x

Figure 21. INTELSAT Earth Station Configuration Overview......................................69
Figure 22. IP-VPN over TCP/IP Illustration .................................................................89
Figure 23. Illustration of Planned IRIS Space System Configuration ............................96

xi

List of Tables
Table

Page

Table 1. Evolution of INTELSAT Satellite Capacity (INTELSATs I-IX) ......................8

xii

List of Acronyms
Acronym

Definition

ABM
ACK
A/D
ADCCP
AGC
ANSI
AOR
AP
ARABSAT
ARP
ATM
BGP
BPSK
BVSAT
CCTV
CDMA
Centrex
CFDAMA
CFDM
CFM
CME
COMSAT
COTS
CSC
CSMA/CD
CSRF
DAMA
DDoS
DNS
DoD
DoS
DSSS
EIGRP
EM
EMP
FDM
FDMA
FDOA
FEC
FM

Asynchronous Balanced Mode
Acknowledgement
Analog-to-Digital
Advanced Data Communication Control Procedures
Automatic Gain Controller
American National Standards Institute
Atlantic Ocean Region
Access Point
Arab Satellite Communications Organization
Address Resolution Protocol
Automatic Teller Machine
Border Gateway Protocol
Binary Phase Shift Keying
Broadband VSAT
China Central TV
Code Division Multiple Access
Central Office Exchange
Combined Free DAMA
Companded FDM
Companded Frequency Modulation
Coronal Mass Ejection
Communications Satellite
Commercial-off-the-Shelf
Common Signaling Channel
Carrier-Sense-Multiple Access/Collision Detection
Cross-Site Request Forgery
Demand Assignment Multiple Access
Distributed DoS
Domain Name System
Department of Defense
Denial of Service
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol
Electromagnetic
EM Pulse
Frequency Division Multiplexing
Frequency Division Multiple Access
Frequency Difference of Arrival
Forward Error Correction
Frequency Modulation

xiii

FSS
FTP
GEO
GIG
GPRS
GPS
HDLC
HPA
HTML
IBS
ICMP
IDR
IF
IFRB
IM
IP
IPsec
IRIS
IS
IS-IS
ISP
ISS
ITU
ITSP
JCTD
JIIM
JSC
LAN
LAPB
LEO
LFSR
LNA
LOP
LSA
LTTE
MAC
MCPC
MEO
MF
MIB
MMS
NAK
NAP
NCC
NMS

Fixed Satellite Service
File Transfer Protocol
Geostationary Earth Orbit
Global Information Grid
General Packet Radio Service
Global Positioning System
High-Level Data Link Control
High Power Amplifier
Hypertext Markup Language
INTELSAT Business Services
Internet Control Message Protocol
Intermediate Data Rate
Intermediate Frequency
International Frequency Registration Board
Intermodulation Product
Internet Protocol
IP Security
Internet Routing in Space
INTELSAT
Intermediate System to Intermediate System
Internet Service Provider
International Space Station
International Telecommunications Union
Internet Telephony Service Provider
Joint Capability Technology Demonstration
Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental, and Multi-National
Johnson Space Center
Local Area Network
Link Access Procedure Balanced
Low Earth Orbit
Linear Feedback Shift Register
Low Noise Amplifier
Line of Position
Link State Advertisement
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Media Access Control
Multiple Channels per Carrier
Medium Earth Orbit
Multi-Frequency
Management Information Base
Multimedia Messaging Service
Negative ACK
Network Access Point
Network Control Center
Network Management System

xiv

NOC
OSI
OSPF
PC
PCM
PCMCIA
PDP
PoP
PPP
PPTP
PRNG
PSTN
QPSK
RF
RIP
RMP
SCPC
SGSN
SIP
SMS
SNMP
SNR
SPADE
SRMP
SSES
SSH
SSID
SS/L
SSP
SSPA
SS/TDMA
TCM
TCP
TDM
TDMA
TDOA
TLS
TT&C
TTL
TV
TWTA
UDP
VoIP
VPN
VSAT

Network Operations Center
Open Systems Interconnection
Open Shortest Path First
Personal Computing
Pulse Code Modulation
Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
Packet Data Protocol
Point-of-Presence
Point-to-Point Protocol
Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
Pseudorandom Number Generator
Public Switched Telephony Network
Quadrature Phase Shift Keying
Radio Frequency
Routing Information Protocol
Reliable Multicast Protocol
Single Channel per Carrier
Serving GPRS Support Node
Session Initiation Protocol
Short Message Service
Simple Network Management Protocol
Signal-to-Noise Ratio
SCPC PCM Multiple Access Demand Assignment Equipment
Scalable RMP
Single Satellite Ephemeris Solution
Secure Shell
Service Set Identifier
Space Systems/Loral
Satellite Service Provider
Solid State Power Amplifier
Satellite-Switched/TDMA
Trellis-Coded Modulation
Transmission Control Protocol
Time Division Multiplexing
Time Division Multiple Access
Time Difference of Arrival
Transmitter Location Systems
Telemetry, Tracking, and Control
Time to Live
Television
Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier
User Datagram Protocol
Voice over Internet Protocol
Virtual Private Network
Very Small Aperture Terminal

xv

WAN
WEP
WLAN
WNA
WPA
XSS

Wide Area Network
Wireless Encryption Protocol
Wireless LAN
Wireless Network Adapter
Wi-Fi Protected Access
Cross-Site Scripting

xvi

A SURVEY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
VULNERABILITIES

I: Introduction

The use of satellite communications, both commercial and military, has been
increasing steadily over the past several years, both in the U.S. and in other countries.
Additionally, since satellite communications technology advances have allowed these
satellites to decrease in size while maintaining capabilities, the cost of launching and
using communications satellites has decreased. Many of these satellites utilize
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, enabling further cost reductions. These
cost decreases have enabled other (less advanced) countries to obtain space assets,
including those that could serve as anti-satellite payloads. Many countries, if not
purchasing their own satellites, are leasing transponders on-board commercial
communications satellites, such as the INTELSAT satellites [4].
Satellite communications are the “backbone” of net-centric warfare. They are
important for sending information to widely-dispersed, mobile forces. There are not
enough military-dedicated satellites on-orbit to provide the bandwidth required to
transmit these volumes of information. Therefore, the U.S. military relies on both
military and commercial satellites to provide these communications. This reliance on
commercial space systems for military operations makes these assets vulnerable to
attacks by adversaries. As Robert Ackerman’s article entitled Space Vulnerabilities
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Threaten U.S. Edge in Battle states, “the disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction of
space systems or services could seriously affect U.S. war fighting capabilities” [4]. As of
April 2006, the percentage of communications being provided by commercial
communications satellites for Operation Iraqi Freedom was an astounding eighty-four
percent, according to Hank Rausch’s Jamming Commercial Satellite Communications
during Wartime: an Empirical Study. Much of these commercial satellite
communications were being supplied via leased transponders on-board INTELSAT and
EUTELSAT satellites. Unfortunately, these commercial communications satellites are
not built with the capabilities to protect themselves from potential attacks, such as
jamming [130]. Such attacks could cause military communications to become
unavailable at critical moments during a conflict.
The criticality of satellite communications to U.S. military operations makes the
understanding of the vulnerabilities in satellite communications systems highly important
in order to be able to thwart possible future attacks of these systems. This research aims
to dissect typical satellite communications systems (which include a space segment, an
Earth segment, and a user segment) to: 1) provide a better understanding of possible
attacker entry points into the systems, 2) provide a better understanding of satellite
communications systems vulnerabilities, and 3) examine the possible impacts of these
vulnerabilities to U.S. military operations.
The remainder of this document is divided into four chapters. Chapter two
contains background information on communications satellite systems, particularly the
INTELSAT system. It includes information on the INTELSAT space segment (i.e. the
satellites), the INTELSAT Earth segment including both INTELSAT standard Earth
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stations and very small aperture terminals (VSATs), and multiple access schemes utilized
in communications satellite systems. This information all ties into the determination of
all the possible entry points into a communications satellite system that is presented in the
third chapter. In addition, a discussion of some emerging and proposed satellite systems
is presented in order that any new access points and vulnerabilities that arise due to these
systems may be analyzed. Finally, several examples of attacks on communications
satellite systems that have taken place in the past are provided as evidence that these
types of attacks are possible and that the threat of attacks on U.S. space assets is real.
Chapter three presents a breakdown for each segment of a communications
satellite system, down to the component-level. From this level it is possible to identify
the possible access points in each segment that may allow an attacker access to the
communications satellite system. Once all of the access points are determined, it is then
possible to analyze each access point and determine the vulnerabilities that each poses to
the overall communications satellite system architecture. The results of this analysis are
presented in the fourth chapter.
In addition to the vulnerabilities of each access point, chapter four also discusses
which access point is most vulnerable within each satellite communications system
segment. An example of the impact these vulnerabilities can have on a particular satellite
system, namely INTELSAT 14 which is the satellite planned to carry the Internet routing
in space (IRIS) payload, is also presented in this chapter.
Chapter five provides a summary of research findings. Also, some ideas for
future work in this area are presented

3

II: Background
2.1 Introduction

The U.S. continues to dominate the military space arena, as it has since the end of
the Cold War, owning over half of all the military satellites currently in orbit. In the
recent past, the U.S. military has come to rely more heavily on commercial space systems
to provide communications. In fact, during the Gulf War, INTELSAT provided the
majority of long haul communications. The 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization cautioned that the
U.S. may be making itself vulnerable to a “space Pearl Harbor” because of its strong
dependence on space systems. The report recommended that the U.S. develop ways to
protect its space assets [146].
Earth stations and communications links are the most vulnerable space systems
elements and may be susceptible to attack by any of the following means: conventional
military means, computer hacking, and electronic jamming. Several mitigation methods,
such as shielding, directional antennas, and burst transmissions, can help to protect the
communications links. However, these methods cannot completely protect the links,
leaving them still vulnerable to some attacks. The Earth stations, on the other hand, are
susceptible to physical attacks which could potentially wipe out communications across
the space system, especially since most commercial space systems have only one network
operations center (NOC) and one Earth station. For this reason, countries may need to
protect their satellite Earth stations by means of basic military force [146].
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2.2 History of INTELSAT and INTELSAT Satellite Capacity

In August 1964, the international organization INTELSAT was created to produce,
own, and operate a global communications satellite system. INTELSAT was a treatybased organization made up of nearly 150 member nations. In 2000, the member nations
agreed to INTELSAT becoming a private company, forming INTELSAT Ltd.
INTELSAT Ltd is based in Bermuda [45, 150]. Today, INTELSAT is the world’s
leading provider of GEO satellite services, owning and operating more than fifty
communications satellites (COMSATs) [51]. INTELSAT satellites offer a variety of
services, including: telephony, data transfer, fax, television (TV) broadcasting, and
teleconferencing. INTELSAT offers a wide range of Earth terminals that can be used to
access its satellites. These terminals range from 0.5 meters (m) to 30 m and can be
operated in both the C- and Ku- bands. Note that C-band operating frequencies are
nominally 6 gigahertz (GHz) for the uplink and 4 GHz for the downlink, and in the Kuband, operating frequencies are typically 14 GHz for the uplink and 11 to 12 GHz for the
downlink [45].
INTELSAT’s first COMSAT, INTELSAT I (also known as Early Bird), was
launched on April 6, 1965. INTELSAT I was the first commercial COMSAT and it was
used to provide telecommunications services between the United States and Europe.
INTELSAT I carried 240 two-way voice circuits or one TV channel. Only two earth
stations (one in the U.S. and one in Europe) could access INTELSAT I at any one time,
creating only one point-to-point trunk [8, 143]. INTELSAT launched its second series of
satellites, the INTELSAT II satellites, in 1967. The INTELSAT II satellites offered
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coverage of the Atlantic and Pacific regions [83]. Like INTELSAT I, the INTELSAT II
satellites also carried 240 two-way voice circuits [108]. In contrast to the INTELSAT I
satellite, the INTELSAT II satellites could provide TV and phone services
simultaneously [8]. On the INTELSAT III series satellites, launched between 1968 and
1970, there was a significant increase in capacity per satellite over the INTELSAT I and
INTELSAT II satellites. Each INTELSAT III satellite carried 1200 to 1500 two-way
voice circuits or four TV channels [83, 108]. INTELSAT began launching its
INTELSAT IV series satellites in 1971. The INTELSAT IV series satellites carried
between 3,000 and 9,000 two-way voice circuits or twelve TV channels (that is, one color
TV channel per repeater) [83, 108]. Due to demands for more capacity, in 1975
INTELSAT began launching its INTELSAT IV-A series satellites. The nominal
INTELSAT IV-A capacity was 6,000 two-way voice circuits plus two TV channels, with
their capacity capable of reaching a maximum of 15,000 two-way voice circuits. The
INTELSAT V satellites, launched from 1980 to 1984, had a nominal capacity of 12,000
two-way voice circuits plus two TV channels. An additional maritime communications
subsystem was incorporated into INTELSAT 505, 506, 507, 508, and 509. The maritime
communications subsystem consisted of thirty voice circuits for high-power mode and
fifteen voice circuits for low-power mode. To maintain the necessary amount of
capacity in the Atlantic region, INTELSAT modified the INTELSAT V satellites,
creating the INTELSAT V-A series. The INTELSAT V-A series was launched from
1985 to 1989 and each satellite in the series has a capacity of 15,000 two-way voice
circuits plus two TV channels. The INTELSAT VI series satellites, launched from 1989
to 1991, each has a nominal capacity of 24,000 two-way voice circuits plus three TV
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channels, while the INTELSAT VII series satellites carry a nominal capacity of 18,000
two-way voice circuits plus three TV channels [108]. The INTELSAT VI
communications payload included a static and dynamic switching network. The static
network allowed transponder interconnections, while the dynamic network made possible
satellite switched time division multiple access (SS/TDMA). SS/TDMA will be discussed
further in the section on multiple access schemes [8]. The INTELSAT VII satellites,
which replaced the INTELSAT V and INTELSAT V-A satellites in the Pacific region,
were launched between 1993 and 1996. The INTELSAT VII series satellites are smaller
than the INTELSAT VI series satellites, a change from the current trend of increased size
and capacity with each additional satellite series. The INTELSAT VII series satellites are
smaller due to a requirement for more flexibility, which was accomplished by the use of
many switches to interconnect INTELSAT VII’s increased number of antenna beams.
INTELSAT VII-A satellites, a “growth version” of INTELSAT VII, have nominal
capacities of 22,500 two-way voice circuits and three TV channels. The INTELSAT VIII
series satellites, which began launching in 1997, also have a capacity of 22,500 two-way
voice circuits and three TV channels [108]. The INTELSAT VIII-A satellites,
INTELSAT 805 and 806 which were launched in 1998, have approximately the same
capacity as the INTELSAT VIII series satellites [108, 150]. The difference between the
INTELSAT VIII and INTELSAT VIII-A series satellites is a major restructuring of the
communications payload. The INTELSAT IX series satellites, launched from 2001 to
2003, were intended to replace the INTELSAT VI satellites [108]. The INTELSAT IX
satellites each carry approximately 600,000 two-way voice circuits or 600 TV channels, a
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dramatic increase over the early series INTELSATs [83]. A summary of the evolution of
INTELSAT capacity for Series I through Series IX can be seen in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Evolution of INTELSAT Satellite Capacity (INTELSATs I-IX) [8, 83, 108, 143]
Satellite

Capacity

INTELSAT I

240 two-way voice circuits or 1 TV channel

INTELSAT II

240 two-way voice circuits or 1 TV channel

INTELSAT III

1200-1500 two-way voice circuits or 4 TV channels

INTELSAT IV

3000-9000 two-way voice circuits or 12 TV channels

INTELSAT IV-A

6000 two way-voice circuits plus 2 TV channels or 15,000 two-way voice
circuits

INTELSAT V

12,000 two-way voice circuits plus 2 TV channels and 15 (low power
mode) or 30 (high power mode) two-way voice circuits for maritime
communications subsystem

INTELSAT V-A

15,000 two-way voice circuits plus 2 TV channels

INTELSAT VI

24,000 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels

INTELSAT VII

18,000 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels

INTELSAT VII-A

22,500 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels

INTELSAT VIII

22,500 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels

INTELSAT VIII-A

22,500 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels

INTELSAT IX

600,000 two-way voice circuits or 600 TV channels

In 2004 INTELSAT continued with its trend of launching large, high capacity
satellites with the launch of INTELSAT 10-02. INTELSAT 10-02 is the replacement for
an INTELSAT VII series satellite, INTELSAT 707. INTELSAT 10-02 carries up to 70
C-band and 36 Ku-band 36-megahertz (MHz) equivalent transponder units. This
capacity compares to the INTELSAT IX series satellites with INTELSAT 907 carrying
76 C-band and 22 Ku-band 36-MHz equivalent transponder units [90].
INTELSAT launched another satellite, INTELSAT 11, in late 2007. INTELSAT
11 is intended to replace INTELSAT 6B and INTELSAT 3R, which were formerly
named PAS-6B and PAS-3R and were owned by PanAmSat. PanAmSat and its satellites
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were acquired by INTELSAT in 2006. INTELSAT 11 has a communications payload
which consists of 25 C-band and 18 Ku-band transponders [90].

2.3 Satellite Access Points

INTELSAT standard Earth stations (Standards A, B, C, D (no longer in use), E, F,
G, H, and K) provide access to the INTELSAT satellites. Access to the satellites requires
a choice of modulation and multiple access techniques. In addition, cross-strapping
allows interconnections between C-band and Ku-band earth stations. This is possible
starting with the INTELSAT V series satellites [2, 9, 108].

2.3.1 INTELSAT Standard A
The INTELSAT Standard A terminal operates in the C-band and it has been used
for all INTELSAT series satellites (I to IX). A smaller Standard A antenna size, which
can be used with INTELSAT satellite series beginning with INTELSAT V, was
introduced in 1986. Antennas sizes were reduced from 29-32 m to 15-18 m. The smaller
antenna size caused the Standard A gain requirements to be reduced. The modulation
and multiple access formats that are compatible with Standard A terminals include:
frequency division multiplexing/frequency modulation (FDM/FM), companded FDM/FM
(CFDM/FM), single channel per carrier/quadrature phase shift keying (SCPC/QPSK),
TV/FM (TV transmissions using FM), time division multiple access (TDMA),
QPSK/intermediate data rate (IDR), INTELSAT Business Services (IBS), Trellis-coded
modulation (TCM)/IDR, and demand assigned multiple access (DAMA). Trellis-coded

9

modulation is a modulation scheme which allows highly efficient transmission of
information over band-limited channels (for example, telephone lines). All of the
aforementioned multiple access formats will be discussed in more detail later in this
section [108].

2.3.2 INTELSAT Standard B
INTELSAT’s Standard B terminal also operates in the C-band. Its use began with
the INTELSAT IV series satellites. The Standard B terminals differ from the Standard A
terminals in their use of smaller antenna sizes, ranging from approximately 11 to 13 m.
The smaller antenna size again means a decrease in antenna gain, and therefore a higher
per-circuit satellite usage charge. The higher per-circuit usage charge is the reason why
Standard A terminals are still more widely used than Standard B terminals today, despite
the goal of the Standard B terminals to provide a lower-cost terminal for nations with
modest communications traffic requirements (less than twenty-four voice circuits). The
modulation and multiple access formats used with Standard B terminals include:
CFDM/FM (companding helps offset the lower antenna gain), SCPC/QPSK, TV/FM
(transitioning away from TV/FM to digital TV transmission), QPSK/IDR, IBS,
TCM/IDR, DAMA, and low-cost TDMA [108].

2.3.3 INTELSAT Standard C
INTELSAT’s Standard C terminal’s use began with the INTELSAT V satellites.
The Standard C terminal operates in the Ku-band. Standard C terminals can incorporate
two antennas separated by approximately 10 to 20 miles in order to overcome attenuation
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due to rain via spatial diversity. The Standard C terminals are generally utilized by
nations with major communications requirements, as are the Standard A terminals, but
these countries usually already have at least one Standard A terminal. The modulation
and multiple access formats that are compatible with the INTELSAT Standard C
terminals include: FDM/FM, CFDM/FM, QPSK/IDR, IBS, and TCM/IDR [108].

2.3.4 INTELSAT Standard D
INTELSAT’s Standard D terminal, decommissioned in 1998, operated in the Cband. Standard D terminals were intended for use in places with very low satellite
communications requirements, only about one to two voice circuits per terminal. In
general, Standard D terminals, which were lower-cost than Standard B terminals, were
used by small islands in the Pacific and some African nations for communications
between the rural areas and the countries’ capitals. The only modulation and multiple
access format used with the Standard D terminals was SCPC/companded frequency
modulation (CFM) [108].

2.3.5 INTELSAT Standards E and F
INTELSAT’s Standard E and F terminals began use in the mid-1980s.
They only differ by frequency band, Standard E operating in the Ku-band and Standard F
operating in the C-band. These two terminals are used particularly with IBS. Instead of
serving entire nations, Standards E and F are used to serve specific customer locations or
multiple customers in small regions, for example a big city. The modulation and multiple
access formats compatible with Standard E terminals include: QPSK/IDR, IBS, and
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TCM/IDR. The Standard F compatible modulation and multiple access formats are
CFDM/FM, QPSK/IDR, IBS, TCM/IDR, and DAMA [108].

2.3.6 INTELSAT Standard G
The INTELSAT Standard G terminals can be used in either the C-band or the Kuband. Standard G terminals are used for services offered by countries that lease or
purchase INTELSAT capacity. In the case of Standard G terminals, the network operator
has the freedom to choose most system characteristics. The terminal must simply abide
by the rule that it cannot interfere with other satellite users. This freedom to choose the
terminal design characteristics means that all modulation and multiple access formats are
acceptable, as long as INTELSAT agrees [108].

2.3.7 INTELSAT Standards H and K
INTELSAT Standards H and K are like Standards E and F in that they only differ
in frequency. Standard H operates in the C-band and Standard K operates in the Ku-band.
Standards H and K were implemented in the late 1990s. Standards H and K employ even
smaller antennas than Standards E and F. The modulation and multiple access formats
compatible with Standard H terminals include both IBS and DAMA. For the Standard K
terminals only IBS is compatible [108].

2.3.8 INTELSAT Services
IDR services, introduced in 1984, provide digital communications to international
public switched telephony networks (PSTNs) and are available on nearly all INTELSAT

12

satellites. IDR utilizes QPSK modulation and shares transponders via frequency division
multiple access (FDMA). IDR is employed by INTELSAT Standards A, B, C, E, and F
terminals. It is the digital counterpart to the analog FM/FDMA carriers [2, 8, 108].
IBS was also launched in 1984 and has the same transmission characteristics as
IDR, except for a different data rate. IBS is used for private communications via Earth
terminals located at specific customer sites or in nearby cities. Standards E, F, H, and K
are used primarily for IBS [108]. Video conferencing is offered via occasional use IBS
[2].
Intelnet was set up in the mid-1980s and supports low rate transmission services
to/from small terminals (2-8 feet in diameter). These small terminals then communicate
with larger hubs. The multiple access formats and modulation techniques that can be
used for Intelnet are FDMA or code division multiple access (CDMA) and binary phase
shift keying (BPSK), QPSK, or spread spectrum [2, 108]. The Intelnet service is used to
gather and disperse data between hubs and very small aperture terminals (VSATs) [2].
For Intelnet leases, Earth stations are expected to meet the Standard G terminal
specifications. However, INTELSAT may approve terminals not meeting these
specifications as “non-standard” terminals [10].

2.3.9 Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs)
VSAT networks are in many cases used to connect and provide Internet protocol
(IP)-based multimedia services to companies whose corporate offices and manufacturing,
supply, and distribution centers are widely dispersed. Each INTELSAT VSAT terminal
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is interconnected via a large central hub which is located at a gateway Earth station.
VSAT terminals, because they are small, are fairly inexpensive [2].
The INTELSAT system features several different types of VSAT networks,
including: data transaction-type networks; circuit-switched-type networks; video, audio,
and data distribution-type networks; and micro-terminal-type networks [10].
Data transaction networks are the most frequently used type of INTELSAT VSAT
network. Two-way data transmission is the major function of this type of VSAT network.
Data transaction networks have a star configuration (see Figure 1). In this type of
configuration a central hub functions as both a network control center (NCC) and a traffic
gateway.

Figure 1. VSAT Network - Star Configuration

Central hubs in this type of network serve to: monitor links at the VSATs, configure the
network, enable and disable VSATs, download software, collect network statistics, assign
satellite capacity, and in some cases may also operate as a packet switch [10].
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Circuit-switched VSAT networks have a both pre-assigned circuits and demandassigned circuits, with demand assignment used only for voice circuits. Mesh or star
topologies are commonly used for this type of network (See Figure 2) [10]. In the case of
a mesh configuration with demand assigned circuits, a VSAT uses a common signaling
channel (CSC) to send a request to the hub Earth station that a link is set up between the
requesting VSAT and another VSAT. The hub Earth station informs the called VSAT
that there has been a link request and then the hub assigns two channels to link the two
VSATs. When the call has ended, the channels are free to be used when another request
is made. In a mesh configuration with pre-assigned circuits, all networked VSATs use
the same channel to receive and transmit, usually via a TDMA multiple access scheme
[48].

Figure 2. VSAT Network - Mesh Configuration

Voice transmission is the main role of circuit-switched VSAT networks, with data
transmission coming in second. Video conferencing may also be available through these
networks. Assignment of voice circuits is done either from an NCC or via a distributed
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control procedure. The NCC also performs monitoring and control of network traffic,
network configuration, generation of call records, software downloads, and data
recording [10].
Video, audio, and data distribution VSAT networks typically have a star topology.
In actuality, the network management systems for this type of VSAT network can operate
with several traffic gateways (in a multi-star configuration). Digital audio and data
distribution networks often use a TDM carrier. CDMA cannot be used for these
networks [10].
Micro-terminal VSAT networks, which are used for portable communications,
employ CDMA to alleviate interference problems caused by large antenna beamwidths.
In particular, direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) CDMA is used. As in the case of
circuit-switched VSAT networks, voice transmission is the main function of these microterminal networks. Data and low-rate imagery applications can also be supported.
Micro-terminal networks typically operate in a star configuration. Operation in a multistar configuration is also possible [10].
In addition to the aforementioned multiple access schemes, there are also
contention-based random access schemes such as Aloha and its variations that are
generally used with VSATs. In the case of unslotted Aloha, any user can transmit at any
time. If the information is received correctly, the receiving hub station sends an
acknowledgement. If no acknowledgement is received by the user, the information is
retransmitted after waiting for a period of time. With slotted Aloha, the packets are
transmitted in time slots [84, 98].
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In addition to the previously mentioned Intelnet services, INTELSAT offers
VSAT networks for domestic or international lease as part of INTELSAT’s multi-use
transponder services offering. For leases within the multi-use transponder services, Earth
stations are expected to meet Standard G terminal specifications [10].
INTELSAT also offers a service called Broadband VSAT (BVSAT), which is a
bandwidth-on-demand service. The BVSAT network offers high speed networking for
data, voice, video, and Internet traffic. As part of the BVSAT network, INTELSAT has
located gateways in four major regions: Europe and the Middle East, Africa, the
Americas, and the Asia-Pacific region. BVSAT employs LINKWAY Infrastructure
VSATs from Comsat Laboratories, a division of ViaSat [157].
LINKWAY is a “hubless” VSAT system which allows each terminal to use a
range of bandwidth over multiple transponders. LINKWAY offers two VSAT system
options: LINKWAY 2100 and linkway.ip. Both of these terminal types are interoperable
over C- and Ku- band fixed satellite service (FSS) satellites, such as the INTELSAT
COMSATs. LINKWAY 2100 BVSAT networks can employ a mesh, star, or hybrid
topology, which allows terminal to be capable of accessing all channels in the network
(see Figure 3). Therefore, each aforementioned network topology is available from a
single platform.
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Figure 3. VSAT Network - Hybrid Configuration

Linkway.ip specifically handles IP applications. Some applications for which linkway.ip
is ideal include: Internet Service Provider (ISP) point of presence (PoP) connections,
voice over IP (VoIP), and data and video multicasting [157].
INTELSAT’s VSAT network also offers services such as: interoffice
connectivity, point-of-sale transactions, virtual private networks (VPNs), local area
networking (LAN) and wide area networking (WAN), Internet and Intranet, video
conferencing, remote site networking, and VoIP [90].

2.4 Multiple Access Methods

In a network where many Earth stations want to access the bandwidth of a single
transponder, there are several possible methods available for gaining such access. As
mentioned previously, the INTELSAT Earth station standards and VSAT networks
support a number of multiple access schemes. These schemes are as follows: FDMA,
SCPC, multiple channels per carrier (MCPC), DAMA, TDMA, SS/TDMA, and CDMA.
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2.4.1 FDMA
FDMA was first used on INTELSAT I. FDMA is an access method in which a
portion of available radio frequency (RF) spectrum is divided into channels. Each
channel, operating at a different frequency, is assigned to a user to enable multiple users
the ability to use this same portion of spectrum. However, since users are assigned fixed
amounts of bandwidth, it is difficult for bandwidth to be assigned to another user. One of
the disadvantages of using FDMA is that it can create intermodulation (IM) products.
However, IM products can be avoided by operating the satellite’s traveling wave tube
amplifiers (TWTAs) in their linear region, but this decreases the available output power.
FDMA is less complex in terms of networking in comparison to TDMA. The amount of
Earth station equipment required when using FDMA increases as the amount of
simultaneous connectivity increases [143]. See Figure 4 for an illustration of FDM.

Figure 4. Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM) Illustration [101]
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2.4.2 SCPC
SCPC FDM/FM was first used on the INTELSAT II satellites [143]. In SCPC,
one signal operates at a given frequency and bandwidth. SCPC systems are typically
used for voice applications. SCPC carriers are pre-assigned and they share transponder
power and bandwidth through FDMA. SCPC is typically used for thin route
communications traffic, and is as efficient as TDMA when employed with standard Earth
stations [2, 143].

2.4.3 MCPC
Like SCPC, multi-carrier FDM/FM (or MCPC) was first used on INTELSAT II
series satellites and MCPC carriers are also pre-assigned. For an MCPC system, multiple
signals are combined into one bit stream before being modulated onto a carrier. This
carrier can then be transmitted to multiple remote sites. Because all signals have to be
sent to a single location before being combined for transmission, MCPC is at a major
disadvantage compared to SCPC in terms of transmission time. MCPC is very efficient
with heavy traffic. In the case of light traffic, the pre-assigned channels go unused and
cannot be reallocated [143].

2.4.4 DAMA
Demand assignment is used when communications traffic peaks above preassigned channel capacity or in the case of terminals with no pre-assigned channels [108].
A DAMA system can be employed to offer thin routes between PSTN international
gateways (for example, Standard A terminals) to support telephony, fax, and data
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services. A DAMA system can function with Earth stations as small as 1.8 m (i.e.
VSATs, in this case used in a star network configuration). DAMA systems increase
usage efficiency, thereby releasing transponder capacity to be used for other services.
Modulation for DAMA systems is typically chosen to be either QPSK or BPSK [9].

2.4.5 SCPC Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) Multiple Access Demand Assignment
Equipment (SPADE)
INTELSAT’s use of demand assignment systems, its first digital communications
system, began in the early 1970s with SPADE, the use of which ended in 1993 [2, 108].
SPADE is a system in which every channel is shared and assigned according to demand
[143]. SPADE is typically employed by Standard B terminals [108].
In SPADE systems, a signal is modulated onto a carrier using QPSK. The carrier
is then dynamically assigned according to demand. If there is no speech detected, the
carrier will be turned off. SPADE carriers are dynamically assigned over a common
signaling channel (CSC). Each Earth station monitors the CSC and is aware of the
present state of channel allotments. The CSC is divided up into time slots for Earth
stations to request and release channels. SPADE’s utilization of bandwidth is more
efficient than MCPC and is proportionate to that of SCPC. A SPADE transponder having
800 channels is approximately equal to an MCPC transponder with 3200 channels [143].

2.4.6 TDMA
TDMA has been employed by the INTELSAT system since 1985, specifically in
conjunction with INTELSAT Standard A terminals. Application of TDMA to
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INTELSAT Standard B terminals was also made possible by the use of improved forward
error correction (FEC) decoding schemes [9]. Earth stations can typically not see their
own transmissions with INTELSAT’s TDMA systems [2].
TDMA is a multiple access scheme which shares a channel by dividing it into
different timeslots. Signals are transmitted one after another in rapid succession in their
specific timeslot (See Figure 5) [101, 143]. TDMA allows for variation in the allocation
of these timeslots based on current user needs [62].

Figure 5. Time Division Multiplexing Illustration

Precise synchronization between Earth stations and satellites, made possible by precise
clocks and high speed switching elements, is essential to TDMA so the signals arrive at
the satellite in the correct position in the TDMA frame [143]. Since TDMA uses only
one carrier at a time, IM products cannot occur as they can in FDMA [101]. Also,
TDMA provides greater capacity than FDMA systems [108]. One disadvantage of using
a TDMA scheme is that they cause transmission delays for other Earth stations that may
be waiting to utilize the same transponder bandwidth [62].
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2.4.7 SS/TDMA
TDMA is well-suited to connecting beams sequentially, which is part of the
reason for INTELSAT’s switch to SS/TDMA in 1990 [9, 143]. SS/TDMA was first used
on the INTELSAT VI series satellites. The fast switch matrices of INTELSAT VI’s
communications subsystem allowed its repeaters to independently connect to any of six
beams for reception and for transmission. This allows Earth stations in different regions
to communicate with one another [108]. Complete interconnectivity of a total of N
beams can be achieved with N! different satellite switch modes. SS/TDMA was not
reused on an INTELSAT system until the INTELSAT IX series satellites, likely due to
switch matrix complexity. SS/TDMA systems significantly boost the satellite’s capacity
in comparison to FDMA systems [108, 143].

2.4.8 CDMA
As mentioned previously, CDMA systems can be used with the INTELSAT
VSAT networks, particularly in conjunction with INTELSAT’s Intelnet services.
CDMA uses spread spectrum technology and a coding scheme in which each transmitter
is assigned a particular code. CDMA divides the signal space, as opposed to TDMA’s
division of time and FDMA’s division of frequency. More efficient use of bandwidth is
an effect of partitioning the signal space. In addition, the assigned codes offer a level of
security in that they can only be decoded by their intended receiver. CDMA is not very
susceptible to frequency jamming due in part to its design allowing for flexibility in
center frequency, spread rate, and power level. Also, frequency reuse can be
accomplished with CDMA without causing unwanted co-channel interference. One
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disadvantage of CDMA is that it is vulnerable to strong, undesired signals at the receiver
blocking weaker, desired user signals from gaining access to the bandwidth [62].

2.5 Emerging and Proposed Systems

Over the past forty years in satellite development, the typical approach has been
to keep the satellites as simple as possible, keeping the complexity on the ground. This
was done to minimize the damages caused by catastrophic satellite failures. In recent
years, the on-board complexity of satellites has been increasing with the incorporation of
on-board processing into satellite communications payloads. On-board processing
involves frequency translating and re-amplifying the received signal, as well as
processing it down to the bit level by decoding, de-interleaving, and demodulating it onboard [45].
At present, in addition to on-board processing, the U.S. and several other
countries are in the process of developing satellite laser communications systems. Laserbased communications systems, in addition to providing faster communication, could
help to protect communications links against traditional jamming techniques [146].

2.5.1 Internet Routing in Space (IRIS)
One current U.S. military project could potentially benefit commercial satellite
communications. The project is called IRIS or Internet Routing in Space. In fact, the
U.S. Department of Defense has chosen the INTELSAT General Corporation, a
subsidiary of INTELSAT Ltd to manage the IRIS project [25]. The IRIS payload is
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intended to be carried on-board the INTELSAT 14 satellite, which is planned to be
launched during the second quarter of 2009 [25, 147].
INTELSAT has a contract with Space Systems/Loral (SS/L) for the
manufacturing of INTELSAT 14. The satellite is based on SS/L’s 1300 series satellite
platform, and has a design lifetime of 15 years. The satellite carries 40 C-band and 22
Ku-band transponders. It is intended to be located at 45 degrees West longitude where it
will be capable of providing coverage of the Americas, Europe, and Africa via its four
coverage beams [147].
The IRIS project will come to fruition with the help of commercial industry
participants, such as SEAKR Engineering, Inc. SEAKR Engineering, Inc. manufactures
the IP router for the IRIS payload. According to the Management Plan for the Internet
Protocol Routing In Space (IRIS) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD),
“the commercially-owned/operated IRIS payload aboard IS 14 (INTELSAT 14) may
connect to the Department of Defense (DoD)-controlled global information grid (GIG)
and promote developing policy-based network management for satellite
communications” [106].
The IRIS program benefits the commercial satellite communications community
in the following ways: providing IP routing capability between satellites, reducing
transmission times, providing satellite capacity savings, and increasing networking
flexibility. The on-board router would eliminate the need for a signal’s round trip to an
Earth station, thereby decreasing the number of needed Earth stations. IRIS’ IP routing
technology will allow transponders to communicate with one another by “decoding what
comes up in the C-band or Ku-band and interconnecting the two” [25].
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2.6 Hacking Satellite Communications Links

2.6.1 Tamil Tigers Liberation Front
The Tamil Tigers Liberation Front (or Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - LTTE),
a Sri Lankan separatist group known as terrorist in at least 32 countries, have recently
been blamed for illegally using INTELSAT satellites to broadcast radio and TV
transmissions via the use of an empty transponder on-board INTELSAT 12 [51, 144].
INTELSAT 12 was formerly known as Europe Star 1, a PanAmSat satellite, until
PanAmSat was acquired by INTELSAT Ltd in July 2006 [51]. LTTE was broadcasting
their “National Television of Tamil Eelam and Pulikalin Kural (‘Voice of Tigers’) radio
transmissions” for four hours each day across INTELSAT 12’s transponder 2. The
uplink transmissions are believed to have come from within Vavuniya, northern Sri
Lanka, according to Sri Lankan intelligence officials [51].
INTELSAT 12 is a bent-pipe satellite, which is the most common type of
communications satellite on orbit, mainly due to the fact that this type of satellite is much
less expensive than those with on-board processing. When bent-pipe transponders are
not being fully-used, the empty transponders can be identified by a spectrum analyzer in
combination with a satellite receive antenna. These empty transponders are configured to
retransmit any signal being sent to them. The uplink signal from the hijacker is
transmitted to the satellite in a highly-directed beam which makes finding the hijacker
extremely difficult [51, 144]. There are systems available for locating interferences, but
these systems only can find the general area where the interference came from [144].
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2.6.2 TLS NexGen Interference Locating System
The TLS NexGen system by Transmitter Location Systems, LLC is one system
used to locate interferences. Optional software is available that can be added to TLS
NexGen making it able to geolocate interferences with only one satellite’s orbital
elements (usually an adjacent satellite). This software is called Single Satellite
Ephemeris Solution (SSES). Orbital elements from an adjacent satellite that is receiving
sidelobe energy from the interfering signal in addition to orbital elements of the satellite
receiving the interference are necessary for TLS NexGen without SSES. TLS NexGen
finds the transmitter’s location by calculating the difference in arrival times and
frequencies caused by transmitting the interfering signal through two satellites [151].

In

the time difference of arrival (TDOA) technique, the difference in the arrival time of the
interfering signal from the two satellites is used to determine a longitudinal line of
position (LOP). In the frequency difference of arrival (FDOA) technique, frequency
difference of the interfering signals from the two satellites due to the motion of the
satellites is used to determine a latitudinal LOP. Where the TDOA and FDOA LOPs
intersect is a probability ellipse that contains the interference location [13]. Position
accuracy of the transmitter’s location is typically within a few kilometers. TLS also has a
global network of processing stations, with stations located in Bosque Alegre, Argentina;
Perth, Australia; Ontario, Canada; Beijing, China; Hong Kong, China; Paris, France;
Fucino, Italy; Mexico City, Mexico; Pretoria, South Africa; and Dubai, United Arab
Emirates. Data from these stations on interference incidents is sent to the Global
Operations Center in Chantilly, Virginia for processing [151].
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2.6.3 Falun Gong
Another satellite interference event occurred in 2002 when the Falun Gong
hacked the SinoSat satellite. The interferences on SinoSat were traced back to a “pirate
broadcast operation in Taipei, Taiwan.” This interference event disrupted broadcasts of
China Central TV (CCTV) to remote regions of China and transmission of China
Education TV and in some cases cut off TV entirely in the rural and mountainous regions.
CCTV is a Chinese government-run network. The Falun Gong continually attempts to
broadcasts its transmissions proclaiming the benefits of being a member of the group and
attempting to convince the rest of the Chinese citizens that they have been unfairly
treated by Chinese authorities [17, 51, 144]. In fact, in November 2004 the Falun Gong
hacked into AsiaSat and disrupted signals for approximately four hours [51].

2.6.4 Other Jamming Events
In 2006, Thuraya mobile satellite communications were jammed by Libyan
nationals for nearly six months. In this case, the jamming was aimed at Thuraya satellite
phone-using smugglers of contraband into Libya. During the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war,
Israel attempted to jam the Al-Manar satellite channel which is transmitted by the Arab
Satellite Communications Organization (ARABSAT), illustrating the potential for
commercial satellites to become targets during conflict [146].

2.6.5 Conclusions
This ability to hack into commercial COMSATs could lead to a disastrous
situation in regards to worldwide communications. Potentially, a hijacked satellite in

28

geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) could be directed to crash into another nearby satellite
causing a lot of damage not just to the other satellite but to many satellites in GEO due to
the debris this crash would create. Al-Qaeda being able to use COMSATs in order to
launch an attack against the U.S. may even be possible [144]. It appears that nearly
everyone could pirate satellite capacity if they wanted. In fact, Extreme Media of Garden
City, Michigan reportedly is selling the following videos from its website: “Satellite
Piracy” and “Hacking Digital Satellite Systems” [51].
There are several ways that COMSATs can be protected from potential
interferences, including: data encryption, the use of error protection coding which makes
greater the amount of interference that is acceptable before communications are disrupted,
the employment of directional antennas which reduce vulnerability to jamming, and
shielding which decreases the amount of energy that can be intercepted for the purpose of
jamming. Further protection capabilities are available, but are currently primarily used
for military COMSATs. These protection capabilities are as follows: narrowband
excision schemes that use less bandwidth, burst transmissions and frequency hopping
techniques that prevent potential jammers from “locking-on” to signals, antenna side lobe
reduction increase the focus of the main communications beam and reduce jamming
incidents in the beam side lobes, and nulling antenna systems which observe interference
and combine antenna elements developed to cancel interference [146].

29

2.7 Summary

The U.S.’s heavy reliance on and need to protect its space assets is apparent. In
fact during the Gulf War, the U.S. relied heavily on the INTELSAT fleet of commercial
COMSATs. Therefore, a brief history of INTELSAT and the evolution of INTELSAT’s
satellite capacity were discussed in this chapter. A brief discussion of the INTELSAT
satellite access points identified a few of the possible areas where space systems may be
vulnerable to attack, to include the Earth stations, VSAT networks, and multiple access
methods. A more in-depth analysis of a typical space system’s access points will be
provided in Chapter 3 as the next step to achieving the end-goal of providing a
vulnerabilities assessment of a space system.
This chapter highlighted several emerging (or proposed) satellite system
technologies, including on-board processing, satellite laser communications, and Internet
routing in space (IRIS). This information will allow an assessment of future
vulnerabilities of space systems and possible ways to protect these emerging systems
from attack.
Finally, to illustrate the susceptibility of U.S. space systems to attack, several
examples were provided of hacking events involving satellite communications links that
have occurred in the recent past. These include the hacking of INTELSAT 12 by the
Tamil Tigers Liberation Front and the hacking of SinoSat by the Chinese Falun Gong.
Several ways to stop these RF interference events from taking place were discussed, such
as: using an interference locating system, data encryption, error protection coding,
frequency hopping, and antenna sidelobe reduction.
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III: Methodology
3.1 Introduction

In order for the U.S. to develop ways to protect its space assets, it is necessary
first to understand the vulnerabilities of the U.S.’s space assets. To accomplish this
vulnerabilities assessment, the space systems need to be analyzed at the component-level
in order to determine possible access points for attackers. As stated in Chapter 2, the
Earth stations and the communications links (between user terminals, Earth stations,
NOCs, and satellites) are the most vulnerable components of U.S. satellite systems to
attack. Therefore, it is necessary to take a closer look at these components to determine
possible access points in each.

3.2 Satellite

A typical satellite communications link involves a satellite and two or more Earth
terminals. Information is exchanged between the satellite and these terminals via RF
antennas located on-board the satellite and at the Earth station facilities (or user
locations). The antennas are the main access points to the satellite. Access to
information being passed across the satellite goes even further than just the antennas. It
passes from the antennas to one of the many on-board transponders. In a typical bentpipe satellite, the transponders amplify the information signal and frequency-translate it
before transmitting it back down to the ground. Transponder amplifiers are usually either
traveling-wave tube amplifier (TWTA)-type or solid state power amplifier (SSPA)-type.
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In the case of INTELSAT 14, which is the satellite intended to carry the IRIS
payload, there will be an access router on-board the satellite. The access router will not
only be able to route incoming information to the proper destination, but it will also
enable all elements of the satellite to be addressed individually via IP and be
interconnected via on-board routing [145]. See Figure 6 for an illustration of the
breakdown of the satellite access points.

Figure 6. Satellite Breakdown Showing Access Point Components

Notice that only the TWTA-type power amplifiers are shown in Figure 6. This is due to
the fact that this type of power amplifier is susceptible to high-voltage breakdown.
SSPAs do not have these types of failure modes [158].
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3.2.1 Satellite Access Router
Since Internet routing in space is an emerging advancement in satellite
communications technology, there is no current standard for the on-board access router’s
implementation and usage. Therefore, examining a specific example where Internet
routing in space will be implemented is necessary. This discussion will focus on the IRIS
payload to be carried on the INTELSAT 14 satellite.
The IRIS payload will be capable of interconnecting between the C-band and Kuband communications payloads on INTELSAT-14. This interconnectivity will allow
“flexible reconfigurable IP packet routing,” enabling a C-band user to directly
communicate with a Ku-band user and vice versa. All of this is to be accomplished
without the use of an Earth station relay [106].
In the case of the IRIS payload, the uplink signal received by the satellite will first
be demodulated and decoded before being routed by the on-board access router on a
packet-by-packet basis (See Figure 7.). The router allows for voice, video, and data
packets all to be transmitted simultaneously, thereby more efficiently utilizing each
transponder than in the case of a bent-pipe COMSAT [106].
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*Redundancy is not shown
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Figure 7. IRIS Payload Diagram

An illustration of the IRIS access router from SEAKR Engineering, Inc. is shown in
Figure 8 below [138].

Figure 8. IRIS Access Router Configuration

3.2.2 Transponders
In general, COMSATs carry multiple transponders which are separated in
frequency to avoid interference. Bent-pipe transponders receive the incoming
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information signals, amplify them, frequency-translate them, and separate them into
individual transponder channels before re-transmitting them to the required destination.
Figure 9 shows the basic structure of a bent-pipe transponder [57]. In order to get the
most out of any transponder, multiple signals are usually passed through each
transponder using a multiple access scheme. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are several
multiple access schemes that can be utilized, such as: CDMA, TDMA, and FDMA, as
well as variations of each of these [54, 58].

Figure 9. Basic Structure of a Bent-Pipe Satellite Transponder

CDMA allows multiple signals to be sent across each transponder by assigning a
unique code sequence for each signal. This type of multiple access scheme is used for
secure communications. TDMA allows the entire transponder bandwidth to be used by
one user for a limited period of time and once that time is up another user gets their turn.
Multi-frequency (MF)-TDMA is popular for use with VSATs. MF-TDMA employs
frequency hopping to time and bandwidth utilization. With FDMA, each user is assigned
a frequency band. FDMA is used, for example, for point-to-point connectivity [54, 58].
The aforementioned types of multiple accesses are considered fixed assignment
multiple access schemes. DAMA may also be used in which bandwidth is allocated
based on user demand. Bandwidth allocation is controlled at the Network Operations
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Center (NOC) (or on-board the satellite in the case of a satellite with on-board processing
capabilities).Combined Free DAMA (CFDAMA) allows unused channels to be accessed
in a round-robin manner [84].

3.2.3 TWTAs
As mentioned previously there are generally two types of high power amplifiers
(HPAs) that are used on COMSATs, either the TWTA or the SSPA. TWTAs are more
efficient than SSPAs; however TWTAs require relatively high voltages whereas SSPAs
operate at low DC voltages. Therefore, TWTAs can be exposed to a number of possible
failure modes, such as high voltage breakdown [110, 154]. High voltage breakdown
failures can cause spurious discharges and even TWT failure [158].

3.3 Earth Station

As stated in the previous section, the satellite’s on-board antennas are the main
access points to the satellite. The satellite’s antennas are used to pass messages between
Earth stations, NOCs, and user terminals. Earth stations act as interfaces between the
space segments (the satellites) and the terrestrial networks, accessing the satellites’
antennas by way of their own antennas on the ground. The Earth stations also act as
central hubs for VSAT networks, receiving data from the surrounding VSATs and
routing it accordingly. Each Earth station is connected to a network of other Earth
stations and the NOC via the satellite. The Earth station network interconnects each
Earth station and the users in the terrestrial fixed networks in the region which the Earth
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station covers. User terminals can access this Earth station network via network access
points (NAPs). Each Earth station is also connected to the satellite’s entire network of
Earth stations across the globe, allowing interconnections to other Earth stations in
regions outside of the coverage area of the local Earth station [81]. See Figure 10 for a
breakdown of Earth station access points.
In the case of on-board processing satellites, NAPs can be located directly at the
user’s location, providing direct access to the NOC. The on-board processor of the
satellite is capable of routing user information without the need for sending it first
through an Earth station [102].

Figure 10. Earth Station Breakdown Showing Access Point Components
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The access point components linked to the antenna were analyzed in the previous section
and will not be analyzed here. The Earth station’s VSAT data reception capability will be
discussed first.

3.3.1 VSAT Data Reception
VSATs access satellites to relay data from user terminals to Earth stations if
operating in a star configuration. If operating in a mesh configuration, the data can be
relayed from one user terminal to another user terminal via satellite without the need for a
centralized Earth station hub. In some cases a combination of these topologies is used.
For example, several Earth stations (with VSATs connecting to them in star
configurations) can be connected in a multi-star topology. Each star (Earth station and
connecting VSATs) is then connected to every other star in a mesh configuration [156].
Refer to Chapter 2 for more details on VSAT network topologies.

3.3.2 Earth Station Network
Each Earth station that is in the coverage area of the satellite is connected to every
other Earth station in the coverage area via the satellite, thus creating an Earth station
network. This Earth station network is interconnected with the NOC. User terminals
access the Earth station network via NAPs. User terminals can access the NAPs directly
or by using ad hoc routing paths through other mobile terminals in the network [21].
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3.4 Network Operations Center (NOC)

The NOC is connected to each Earth station via the Earth station network, and it
controls the network of user terminals. The NOC provides a web-based interface for
users which is used in disseminating data, a connection to a terrestrial fiber network
through fiber access points for public and private networks, and controls access to
services [122]. In addition, the NOC can be utilized to connect user terminals in one
beam to user terminals in other beams [24].
Whereas in the case of the IRIS payload, the access router is carried on-board the
satellite, in general access routers are located at the NOC. As mentioned previously,
access routers route information packets on a packet-by-packet basis to and from user
terminals and Earth stations. See Figure 11 for a breakdown of NOC access points.

Figure 11. Network Operations Center Breakdown Showing Access Point Components
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Note that in the case of an on-board processing satellite, the on-board processing payload
allows inter-beam connectivity, enabling user terminals in one beam to access user
terminals, Earth stations, and NOCs in other beams. These types of satellites do not
require the NOC in order to connect to other beams [24].

3.4.1 NOC Access Router
As seen in Figure 11, access routers allow (or deny) access to services. These
services can range from dial-up connections to on-demand cable services to wireless
Internet access. The NOC access router can also provide access to Internet service
provider (ISP) critical services. “Critical services” usually refers to situations in which a
“priority dial tone” is provided. These situations typically involve national security
and/or emergency preparedness [14, 60]. In addition, the NOC access router helps
provide Earth station network security by allowing the NOC manager to control access to
services [37].

3.4.2 Fiber Network
The NOC is connected to a private, terrestrial fiber network which provides users
and Earth stations access to the Internet or to a private Intranet. The links between the
NOC and the terrestrial fiber network are usually protected with network firewalls [21].
Internet (and Intranet) access services, such as web browsing, file transfer protocol (FTP),
email, and peer-to-peer, provide user terminals and Earth stations access to public (or
private) Internet protocol (IP) networks. In order to provide email services through
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private IP networks, access to external networks (such as the Internet) is necessary [16].
See Figure 12 for a breakdown of the access points of the terrestrial fiber network.

Figure 12. Fiber Network Breakdown of Access Points

FTP is a network protocol for sending data between computers through a network, such
as the Internet [64]. Peer-to-peer refers to a network that connects computers via mostly
ad hoc connections. This type of network can be used to offer a variety of services,
including: audio, video, and data file sharing or sending telephony traffic [123].
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3.5 User Terminals

User terminals make it possible to access corporate Intranets, the Internet, and
cellular networks from anywhere worldwide by way of satellite connectivity. If a user is
not in a satellite coverage region but wants to access a service offered by this satellite, the
user can access it through a satellite service provider (SSP). The user will connect to the
SSP via a terrestrial IP network, such as the Internet [16]. ISPs, for example, provide
Internet access to their customers in remote locations directly or via points-of-presence
(PoPs) using wireless links [6]. In these remote locations where there is no access to
landlines, user terminals can be connected to standard PC devices to allow access to the
desired multimedia services [77].
Mobile user terminals can be used for both cellular network and satellite access.
When the terminal is within range of the terrestrial cellular network, the user can connect
through the terrestrial network. When the user is outside of the terrestrial network’s
range, the terminal provides cellular access via satellite connectivity [77]. See Figure 13
for a breakdown of user terminal access points.
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Figure 13. User Terminals Breakdown Showing Access Point Components

3.5.1 Wireless Network Adapter
As mentioned previously, user terminals can connect to local Earth station NAPs
directly. These connections may be made through a wireless network adapter at the user
location. The network adapter controls access rights and provides network services [44].

3.5.2 Points-of-Presence (PoPs)
A PoP enables users to access company Intranets, the Internet, and cellular
networks through a local phone number or a dedicated landline [107]. PoP routers
provide access points for user connections. Users can connect to the PoP routers with a
supported serial interface. Access to the router can be provided by one of many protocols,
such as: high-level data link control (HDLC), link access procedure balanced (LAPB), or
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point-to-point protocol (PPP) [77]. See Figure 14 for a breakdown of the PoP access
points.

Figure 14. Points-of-Presence Access Points Breakdown

HDLC is a “bit-oriented synchronous data link layer protocol”. It is used to
transfer data packets between nodes in a network regardless of packet contents. HDLC
provides connection-oriented and connectionless protocol services. Connection-oriented
protocols associate traffic flows with an integer connection identifier which makes
network switches faster. An example of a connection-oriented protocol is transmission
control protocol (TCP)/IP. Connectionless protocols allow messages to be sent between
two network nodes without prior arrangement of the transmission. An example of a
connectionless protocol is IP. HDLC is typically used for point-to-point communications
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using asynchronous balanced mode (ABM). ABM supports peer-to-peer
communications [79].
LAPB is a bit-oriented data link layer protocol derived from HDLC. It is in the
X.25 protocol stack. X.25 is a network layer protocol for packet-switched wide area
network (WAN) communications. X.25’s major use is in processing credit card
transactions and for automatic teller machines (ATMs). LAPB ensures that packets are
free of errors and in the right order sequentially [103].
PPP is a data link layer protocol that is typically used to make direct connections
between two network nodes via a land line or cellular telephone. Most ISPs use PPP for
dial-up Internet access. PPP works with a variety of network layer protocols, such as IP
[127].

3.5.3 Standard PC Devices
Portable user terminals make multimedia services accessible anywhere in the
world. User terminals can be connected to standard PC devices to allow users in remote
locations access to these services. The user terminal to PC device connection is made via
personal computer memory card international association ((PCMCIA) or equivalent)
interface ports [81]. The PCMCIA interface is designed for laptop computers. All
PCMCIA (or simply PC) cards use a 68 pin dual-row connecting interface. They can
have either a 16- or a 32- bit interface [121].
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3.6 Summary

Each piece of a typical space system, to include the satellite, the Earth stations,
the NOC, and the user terminals, has been broken down to the component-level. Possible
access points for attackers were determined in each. Now an assessment of the
vulnerabilities associated with these access points can be made.
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IV: Results

4.1 Introduction

The multitude of vulnerabilities associated with a space system’s access points
will be presented and analyzed, beginning with those of the space segment (or satellite).
From this analysis, the most vulnerable component of each segment (space, Earth, and
user) of the space system will be determined. A specific example relating to an emerging
space system, IRIS, will present a possible attack methodology for this system as well as
other similar systems. The information provided in this chapter serves to warn
developers of future space systems of the susceptibility of their systems to the types of
attacks mentioned and the need to take steps to prevent these attacks from occurring.

4.2 Space Segment Vulnerabilities

As mentioned in the previous chapter, in regards to a typical Earth-orbiting
satellite, there are three access points which may be susceptible to vulnerabilities. These
are the antennas, the transponders, and the TWTAs. In addition, in relation to the
emerging IRIS payload to be carried on INTELSAT 14, the on-board access router may
also be considered a vulnerable access point.
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4.2.1 Satellite Antenna Vulnerabilities
The satellite’s on-board antennas and the RF links being sent to and from them
may be susceptible to both environmental and human factors. These factors can degrade
antenna operations intentionally or unintentionally. The causes of unintentional antenna
performance degradation can include: unintentional RF interference from the side lobes
of an adjacent satellite, due to equipment error, due to human (operator) error, from the
satellite’s own or another nearby Earth station, and ionospheric interference during solar
max; frequency spectrum congestion; multipath; and physical damage caused by the
surrounding environment. The causes of intentional satellite antenna performance
degradation include: intentional RF interference (i.e. RF jamming), spoofing (or
intrusion), meaconing (described below), and deliberate physical attack.
When a signal is masked by another RF signal or by natural RF emissions, such as
during solar max or emissions from other on-board equipment, this is deemed
unintentional interference [27]. An illustration of antenna side lobe interference is shown
in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. Antenna Side Lobe Interference Illustration [118]

An Earth station that is located nearby the satellite’s Earth station could be transmitting at
the same time as the satellite’s Earth station. RF interference from the nearby Earth
station’s antenna’s side lobes could reach the satellite antenna at the same time as the
intended signal, thereby causing interference with the intended signal if the two signals
are of the same frequency. This side lobe interference can also be caused by an adjacent
satellite’s antennas [118]. Antenna pointing errors are a main contributor to side lobe
interference. These pointing errors can come from misalignment, foundation settling,
spacecraft station-keeping or wind deflection among other factors. An error in antenna
pointing results in an increase in antenna gain in the direction of an adjacent satellite.
Signals from the adjacent satellites can then interfere with the intended signal [28]. Also,
notice from Figure 15 that RF interference from terrestrial sources, such as microwave
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towers, can cause interference in the signal being transmitted to the satellite by entering
through the signal’s side lobes.
As can be seen in Figure 16, an antenna’s main lobe contains the majority of the
beam power. Typically, the side lobes have at most 18 decibels less power than the main
lobe. However, the side lobes still radiate strong enough to cause signal interference.

Figure 16. Typical Antenna Beam Pattern [118]

Decibels represent a power ratio. They express how many times more or less
power is contained in a signal (in this case, the side lobes), compared to a certain
reference signal (in this case, the main lobe). Decibels are defined by the following
equation:
dB = 10 * log10(P2/P1)

[Equation 1]

log10 = logarithm, base 10
P1 = the power of the signal we are interested in (from the
side lobes)
P2 = the power of the reference signal (from the main lobe)
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When the spring and fall equinoxes occur each year, the Sun crosses the equator
and passes directly behind each satellite in the GEO belt (See Figure 17.). This causes
the main beam of the Earth station receive antenna to be in direct line-of-sight with the
Sun, causing Sun outage. The Earth station receive antenna picks up the Sun’s
interference, which overwhelms the satellite signal resulting in the Sun’s noise being the
only thing heard at the receive end. Sun outage lasts for approximately ten minutes [118].

Figure 17. Sun Outage Illustration [104]

Since bandwidth is in high demand and the frequency spectrum is limited, the
spectrum is congested with users. Previously unused portions of the frequency spectrum,
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such as the Ka-band, are beginning to be used in emerging systems in order to meet
demand. Also, satellites are employing frequency reuse techniques, such as dualpolarization and spot beams. The International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB)
(formerly International Telecommunication Union (ITU)) is in charge of allocating this
frequency spectrum to different users. Interference can occur when simultaneously
transmitting satellites (or Earth stations) are using frequencies that are too close together,
implying that the channel spacing (or frequency guard bands) is not wide enough.
Insufficient channel spacing can cause overlapping of frequency sidebands and carrier
frequencies of adjacent satellites (or sidebands of adjacent satellites can cause
interference with the carrier frequency of the satellite in question). The sidebands are
bands of frequencies that are higher or lower than the carrier frequency that contain
energy. These sidebands result from the signal modulation process. Congestion of the
frequency spectrum causes difficulty in discriminating the intended signal from the
adjacent satellite (or Earth station) signal and can result in interference due to slight
frequency shifts or phase shifts due to ionospheric reflection. Ionospheric reflection is a
bending of the signal back toward the Earth, which depends on the signal’s frequency,
angle at which the signal is sent traveling through the ionosphere (i.e. angle of incidence),
signal polarization, and ionospheric conditions. These ionospheric conditions include
electron density, which indicates the amount of ionization in the atmosphere.
Atmospheric ionization increases with increases in solar activity [66].
Multipath occurs when RF signals reflect or refract off of objects as they travel
from the satellite to the Earth station and vice versa. These objects can include structures
surrounding the receive antenna such as buildings, as well as objects in the atmosphere
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such as ions (as described in relation to ionospheric reflection above). The transmitted
signal can also bend due to changes in refractive index as it travels through the
atmosphere. Passing through various mediums also causes a change in signal velocity.
Refractive index is a measure of how much the speed of light decreases when traveling
through a particular medium, such as the atmosphere. Multipath can cause signal fading
due to the reflected signal, which will reach the antenna after the intended signal,
interfering with the intended signal. The combined received signal (intended plus
reflected) suffers from time-varying fading [57]. See Figure 18 for an example of
multipath fading.

Figure 18. Multipath Signal Fading Illustration [31]

When a signal is refracted, there is a change in signal polarization. When the
signal is reflected, the polarization is reversed (for example from right-handed circular to
left-handed circular polarization). In this case, when the reflected and intended signals
meet at the antenna, they will cancel each other. The two signals will only cancel each
other completely if the polarization was fully-reversed in the reflected signal and if the
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amplitudes of both of the signals are equal. Otherwise, the multipath signal will only
partially cancel the intended signal. If the multipath signal goes through two reflections
before arriving at the antenna, it will have reversed its polarization twice resulting in the
multipath signal ending up with the same polarization as the intended signal. If these two
signals converge at the antenna, the two signals will add causing the amplitude of the
total received signal to be increased. These variations in signal amplitude can cause
problems for the automatic gain controller (AGC) which is supposed to keep the signal
levels constant [119].
With the antennas being one of the major objects protruding from the satellite’s
surface, they are obviously one of the most vulnerable of the satellite’s components to
physical damage. This damage could come from any number of objects in the space
environment, to include space debris and possibly even meteoroids. Also, the space
environment itself may cause damage to the antenna. Outgassing of materials may occur,
as well as damage caused by the extreme temperatures. Outgassing is the slow release of
a gas that was trapped in a material. The gas can be released from cracks or impurities in
a metal, as well as from sealants, lubricants, and adhesives. Outgassing increases with
increases in temperature. In addition, the sun releases highly-energetic particles into the
space environment during solar flares and coronal mass ejections (CMEs) which can
result in surface charging. Solar flares are violent explosions in the Sun’s atmosphere
which causes a surge of high-energy particles to be released resulting in a proton storm.
A CME involves the Sun ejecting a plasma from the solar corona. The plasma consists of
mainly electrons and protons.
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The low-power signals coming from satellite antennas, like any RF transmission
(including those being sent to the satellite), can be jammed. Jamming involves
intentionally masking a target signal with another RF signal. The signals coming from
the satellite can be jammed using very little jamming power. Jamming can result in
signal degradation or total signal loss [23, 27]. Please refer to Section 2.6 for several
examples of satellite jamming events that have occurred in the past.
Spoofing involves intentionally transmitting false information to the COMSAT in
order to “deceive or computationally overwhelm” the satellite, thereby overriding the
intended signal [27]. The objective of spoofing is to send the receiver a malicious signal
that overpowers the intended signal, fooling the receiver into using a false signal for
further processing. The composite signal received at the antenna is that of the intended
signal plus the spoofed signal plus the signal noise. Spoofing is only possible on
satellites with on-board processing capabilities, because it is at the analog-to-digital (A/D)
conversion stage that the spoofed signal overrides the intended signal. Most on-board
processing satellite receivers have automatic gain control which is important for a
spoofing attack to be successful (See Figure 19.). Spoofing is more serious than jamming,
because the attacker can take control of the receiver with spoofing, while in the case of
jamming the attacker only causes signal degradation [15].

55

Authentic
Spoof signal Noise
signal

This is a bogus message
if spoof succeeds

Down
converter

A/D

Digital
message

Decryption
Check matrices

Front end
amplifier

Demodulate

AGC

Figure 19. Spoofing Vulnerability Illustration [15]

Satellite side lobe energy can be received (via a high gain antenna) by an
unintended target and retransmitted. This is termed meaconing. Meaconing causes the
signal to be delayed in reaching its target. Should a disgruntled employee obtain access
to the satellite and its antennas before launch, the employee could connect a delay device
(such as a wideband analog-to-digital or digital-to-analog converter or a digital delay line)
to the antenna. This would be somewhat easier than trying to capture the satellite signal,
however the likelihood of no one noticing the delay device prior to launch is very low.
The delay device attack is more likely to take place at an Earth station [27].
Intentional physical attack of a satellite became a very real possibility as the U.S.
watched China’s first successful anti-satellite missile test take place in January 2007. On
11 January 2007, a ground-based missile destroyed an obsolete Chinese weather satellite.
According to senior U.S. officials, in 2006 China tried to “blind American satellites” with
lasers. These types of attacks are feasible for low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, but
medium Earth orbits (MEO) and GEO orbits are likely out of range. As these attack
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technologies advance in the years to come, the capability to physically damage an in-orbit
COMSAT and knock out critical communications components becomes closer to reality
[114].

4.2.2 Transponder Vulnerabilities
If an attacker’s signal is sent to a bent-pipe transponder from the satellite’s
antenna and the signal is at the correct carrier frequency, it will be processed along with
the intended signals and re-transmitted along with them down to the receiver. The
attacker’s signal may obscure the intended signal at the receiver if it has a great enough
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) making the receiver unable to discern the intended signal
from the attacker’s signal. In addition, the attacker’s signal raises the noise floor (i.e. the
background noise) of the transponder and causes a reduction in the SNR of all of the
intended signals. If an intended signal gets lost in the background noise, it cannot be
recovered [118, 130].
Typically attackers will utilize a narrowband, high SNR, un-modulated carrier
because these types of carriers can have a greater SNR than modulated carriers. By using
an un-modulated carrier, the attacker achieves the raised noise floor of the intended signal.
Therefore, the attacker’s signal will degrade or completely cut-off communications
across the transponder [130].
In order to carry multiple signals on a single carrier frequency (i.e. a single
transponder) and more efficiently utilize the limited bandwidth available, differing
polarizations are used. Polarization is a property of electromagnetic (EM) waves which
describes the orientation of the oscillations in the plane perpendicular to the direction in
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which the EM wave is travelling. Linear polarization consists of either vertical or
horizontal polarizations which are used in conjunction with each other on a single carrier
frequency to differentiate between signals. Circular polarization consists of either righthanded circular or left-handed circular polarizations depending on which way the EM
wave oscillates about the perpendicular plane. Right-handed and left-handed circular
polarizations can also be used to differentiate between signals on the same carrier
frequency. If an attacker transmits to the satellite with an improper polarization setting
(i.e. when the attacker’s polarization does not exactly match the polarization being
accepted by the satellite antenna feed horn, the result is excess power creeping onto the
other polarization which is likely being used by a legitimate customer. This effect is
called cross-polarization, and it can result in interference with the legitimate customer’s
signal (which is using the opposite polarization on the same transponder) [130].
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, multiple access schemes are also utilized to enable
each transponder to carry multiple signals. CDMA is used for secure communications
because it offers protection against frequency jamming and co-channel interference. Cochannel interference is interference from other signals using the same frequency channel.
However, if the intended signal’s modulation, frequency, and code are known, jammers
can concentrate all their power at that particular frequency to corrupt the intended signal.
If the jammer transmits at a power high enough to compensate for the CDMA jamming
resistance advantage, the jammer could interfere with the intended signal [62, 124].
TDMA avoids interference between user signals by strictly following timeslot schedules.
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, FDMA is susceptible to intermodulation (IM) products.
IM products can cause interference and noise, as well as reduce the power output of the
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satellite that is available for communications. Also, FDMA is vulnerable to co-channel
interference if the channel spacing is not sufficient [62].
Satellites may use spread spectrum which is intended to increase resistance to
jamming by spreading the signal out by way of a spreading code (for example, a unique
pseudorandom number sequence). Because the signal is spread across a wide bandwidth,
spread spectrum is able to lessen multipath signal fading and interference. The spreading
code is typically protected via encryption. Only users with the encryption key can obtain
the spreading code which enables them to de-spread the signal. If an attacker gains
access to the signal’s spreading code, the attacker could spoof other users of the signal
[62, 128].
If linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) are used to create the spreading
sequences for spread spectrum (codes for CDMA) and the pseudorandom number
generator (PRNG) seed (or start) values are known, jamming of a spread spectrum or
CDMA signal becomes relatively easy. The PRNG seed values are the key to the PRNGs
and can be obtained through cryptanalysis or theft [49].

4.2.3 TWTA Vulnerabilities
As was mentioned previously in Section 3.2.3, TWTAs are susceptible to high
voltage breakdown failures that can result in spurious emissions and TWT failure.
Spurious emissions are unintentionally created RF signals which could interfere with the
intended signal. This high voltage breakdown in the TWTA is referred to as multipaction,
or high voltage breakdown in a vacuum. Multipaction is generally a product of the
transmitted frequency and electrode separation [41]. Multipaction occurs typically in
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vacuum environments, such as that inside a TWTA. Charged particles inside the gap
between the TWT electrodes oscillate due to a strong, external electric field. RF energy,
such as that of the signal being passed through the TWTA, puts stress on these charged
particles. Every time the particles hit the walls of the gap other charged particles are
released. More and more charged particles are released as more and more of them hit the
walls of the gap eventually creating enough charged particles to cause a spark which can
cause hardware damage [76, 113].

4.2.4 Satellite Access Router Vulnerabilities
The on-board access router communicates with and is commanded by the
satellite’s on-board computer. The two devices are connected via the router’s console
interface. The satellite’s on-board computer operates all the other spacecraft mechanisms
as well. Almost all current computing systems utilize digital technology which is
vulnerable to interference from ionic disturbances and radiation, for example. Exposure
to these elements of the space environment could result in malfunctions of the on-board
computer and thus the satellite systems that it commands [20]. In fact, many times space
system on-board computers use older technology and older software. These systems are
operating in orbit for ten to fifteen years. By the time they are mission-ended, the onboard computing capabilities are out-dated. In April 2008, hackers are thought to have
loaded a Trojan horse in the computers at Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas.
These hackers then used the Trojan horse to access the uplink to the International Space
Station (ISS) and disrupt certain operations on-board, such as email. The attack was
helped by the fact that ISS on-board computers are running older software for which
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security fixes are no longer available. If this is true, and such an attack can be executed
against the ISS, all earth-orbiting satellites may be at risk. If a hacker could gain access
to the satellite Earth station to plant a virus on the Earth station’s computers, then the
hackers could access the satellite and impede or disrupt communications across the
satellite [75]. In addition, bugs in on-board software in both the on-board computer and
on-board access router could render one or both of these components unable to complete
their respective missions.
In reference to the IRIS payload that is planned to be carried on-board
INTELSAT 14 that has been discussed in previous examples, its use of Internet protocol
(IP) packet routing may cause the satellite to be susceptible to all of the vulnerabilities of
IP packet routing [106]. IP packet routing was intended to make routing as easy as
possible. A packet routed with IP could be accessed, re-routed, or copied by anyone
connected to the network [112]. IP networks are susceptible to spoofing, sniffing, and
session hijacking. Spoofing indicates that an attacker’s machine on the network can
impersonate as another legitimate user’s machine. Sniffing involves an attacker listening
in on communications between other legitimate users. An attack in which the attacker
uses spoofing to take over an existing communications session and acts as one of the
former communicating parties is termed session hijacking [11].

4.2.5 Space Segment Vulnerabilities Summary
Of the satellite access points, the antennas are the outermost, and thus are the
most vulnerable to attack. All signals must pass through the antennas first before being
passed to the other satellite access point components. Therefore, the satellite antenna will
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be the first component compromised before attacks can be placed against any of the other
components such as the transponders, TWTAs, or on-board access router.

4.3 Earth Segment Vulnerabilities

As mentioned in Section 3.3, the Earth stations interface between the satellites
and the terrestrial networks via their own antennas on the ground. The Earth stations
serve as central hubs for VSAT networks, and they are connected to a network of other
Earth stations and the Network Operations Center (NOC) via the satellite. User terminals
access the Earth station network via network access points (NAPs). These access points
and connections not only serve to provide satellite communications services across the
globe, but they also make the Earth station network vulnerable to attack.
The NOC controls the network of user terminals. It provides a web-based
interface for users, a connection to the terrestrial fiber network, and controls access to
services with the help of the NOC access router. In the case of the IRIS payload, the
satellite on-board access router carries the responsibility for controlling access to services.
Since the NOC has additional functions on top of those of a typical Earth station, there
are other supplementary vulnerabilities that could make the NOC susceptible to attack.

4.3.1 Earth Station Antenna Vulnerabilities
Earth station antennas are susceptible to some of the same vulnerabilities as the
satellite antennas, such as RF jamming, interference (co-channel, IM product, and
antenna side lobe), multipath, environmental conditions, and deliberate attack. However,
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since these antennas are located on the ground, there are also different vulnerabilities
associated with these systems.
Like satellite antennas, Earth station antennas are susceptible to damage due to
environmental conditions. However, the differences in the Earth and space environments
bring about different types of vulnerabilities in Earth station antennas. Since Earth
station antennas need to have a clear view of the on-orbit satellites, many times they are
located on rooftops. This particular location makes these antennas susceptible to damage
or destruction by extremely strong winds. If antennas are located in regions that are
prone to storms involving high winds, such as hurricanes or tornadoes, placing them on
building rooftops might not be ideal.
Since Earth station antennas protrude from buildings in order that they can be
keep the satellites in view, they are also the most visible and thus the most vulnerable
components of Earth stations to physical attack. The only weapon an attacker would
need to damage or destroy an Earth station antenna would be a high-powered rifle. Most
metal parabolic dish antennas can withstand a number of bullet impacts before any
degradation in performance occurs. However, fiberglass antennas are more vulnerable to
bullets. They will begin to break with the first bullet impact, causing degradation in
performance right away. If the attackers knows to instead attack the antenna’s feed horn,
just a few rounds of bullets could knock out communications across any antenna.
Located at the focal point of the antenna dish (reflector), the feed horn transmits RF
signals between the transmitter/receiver and the reflector. The feed horn selects the
polarization of the received signal and helps to attenuate co-channel interference. In
addition, Earth station antennas could also be vulnerable to vehicle collisions. If an
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attacker can gain access to the Earth station facility, they could easily just run their
vehicle into a ground-mounted Earth station antenna, causing damage and possibly
knocking out communications [32].
If an attacker is able to gain control of the telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C)
link from the operator on the ground to the satellite, there are several possible attacks that
could take place and may result in loss of control of the satellite. For example, if
multiple Earth stations were used to send a series of tones to a satellite transponder and
then observe the differences in phase of the signals returning from the satellite, the
spoofer could transmit false responses to the satellite to cause incorrect orbit
determination. Also, the attacker could send commands to the satellite via this link or
record commands from the TT&C station to be replayed later and cause duplicate actions
to take place on-board the satellite. Since spare satellites are not always tracked by
TT&C, these satellites are vulnerable to takeover. Then the attacker could move or use
them as they like [155].
In addition to antenna side lobe interference from nearby Earth stations, as
discussed previously in relation to satellite antennas, other forms of terrestrial
interference can cause degradation in the Earth station communications signal. This
interference can come from such devices as radars or radar altimeters which emit pulsed
signals. This type of interference can cause symbol errors in the intended signal. When
there exists a long series of consecutive symbol errors, the result may be receiver failure.
Long-pulse-width interference causes many consecutive symbol errors. As the number
of consecutive errors increases, the sensitivity of the antenna system to interference
increases [133]. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) energy, such as that emitted during a
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nuclear detonation, is also an interference concern. EMP has far-reaching effects. It can
cause performance degradation up to 6,000 kilometers from the detonation site. EMPs
are roughly 1,000 times more intense than radar pulses and are capable of temporarily
halting communications [65]. EMP could even cause interference to a satellite antenna
should a nuclear weapon be launched and detonated in space. The weapon does not
necessarily have to impact the satellite to cause damage to communications. The EMP
energy could degrade performance on any nearby satellites.
Earth station antenna interference can also come from terrestrial sources such as
radio towers, as illustrated in Figure 15. A radio broadcast can enter the Earth station
antenna system at the intermediate frequency (IF) level of the Earth station due to a bad
connection between the Earth station baseband equipment (such as modems and
multiplexers) and the Earth station RF equipment (such as low noise amplifiers (LNAs)
and TWTAs) (See Figure 20.). The radio broadcast would then be transmitted to the
satellite, causing interference with the intended signal.

Figure 20. Radio Frequency Interference Illustration [135]
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4.3.2 VSAT Central Hub Vulnerabilities
An important part of an Earth station’s mission as a VSAT central hub is ensuring
that user terminals connecting to the Earth station network are authorized users.
Bandwidth is typically dynamically allocated to user terminals in TDMA VSAT
networks (for example, mesh networks). As a result of this dynamic allocation, control
data must be sent to each of the user terminals requesting bandwidth. This control
information can be exploited by attackers. If the attacker can obtain a VSAT terminal
and spoof the device ID, the attacker can then insert the rogue device into the network
[86].
In the case of a star topology VSAT network (refer to Section 2.3.9 for details),
the VSAT central hub is a single point of failure. The central hub acts as a control center
and traffic gateway for all of the VSATs that are connected to it. Since the central hub is
the only connection these VSATs have to the rest of the Earth station network, if the
central hub is somehow compromised, then the network of VSATs connected to it will
lose communications. On the other hand, mesh topology VSAT networks do not have
this single point of failure vulnerability because mesh networks have a way of ensuring
messages reach their destination despite any node failures. If an intermediate node along
the route to the message’s final destination node has failed, the mesh VSAT network is
capable of re-routing the message along an alternative route to ensure message delivery
[159].
VSAT networks are also vulnerable to eavesdropping. If an attacker with an
understanding of data link layer protocols purchases a VSAT user terminal, the attacker
can eavesdrop data intended for other legitimate users. In order to listen in on data
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intended for others, the attacker must tune the terminal to the correct frequency (and
timeslot in the case of TDMA networks) and “reverse engineer the VSAT’s embedded
code” [152]. Eavesdropping can result in the compromise of passwords and other secret
information.
Due to the burst-like nature of VSAT data, fixed-assignment multiple access
schemes such as FDMA and TDMA are not typically utilized because they do not
provide efficient bandwidth utilization in this situation. Therefore, some VSAT terminals
employ random access protocols, such as Aloha and its variations (Refer to Section 2.3.9
for more details on the Aloha random access protocols). The Aloha protocols rely on
each VSAT terminal being able to “hear” its own transmissions, and therefore these
protocols are not used in VSAT star topology networks. VSATs in star networks cannot
hear their own transmissions due to the differing bit rates used to transfer data on the
inbound versus the outbound carriers [74]. Since the Aloha protocol allows any user to
transmit at any time, there is a vulnerability to loss of packets due to collisions with other
users’ packets. The probability of packet collision is proportional to the traffic (or the
duty cycle which is the fraction of time that the channel is active) [3]. Due to the fact that
the Aloha protocols are contention-based, they may be unstable during periods of hightraffic loads. When a channel becomes unstable, an increased number of packets are sent
due to retransmissions and the number of successfully delivered messages diminishes
[74].
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4.3.3 Earth Station Network Vulnerabilities
The Earth station network is vulnerable to the same vulnerabilities as each
individual Earth station, including all of the Earth station antenna vulnerabilities. The
Earth station network is susceptible to natural disasters, as well as intentional attacks, like
each Earth station. Continuing with the example of the INTELSAT 14 satellite (which is
planned to carry the IRIS payload), the details of the INTELSAT Earth station network
and network vulnerabilities will be presented.
INTELSAT owns and leases thirteen Earth stations across the globe in the
following locations: Ellenwood, GA; Napa, CA; Fillmore, CA; Hagerstown, MD; Castle
Rock, CO; Paumalu, HI; Riverside,CA; Fuchsstadt, Germany; Clarksburg, MD; Kumsan,
South Korea; Fucino, Italy; Perth, Australia; and Pretoria, South Africa. The Ellenwood,
GA (i.e. the Atlanta Teleport) Earth station is the primary Atlantic Ocean Region (AOR)
gateway for INTELSAT. This will likely be the Earth station used by INTELSAT 14, as
it will be located in the AOR and this is the same Earth station used by IS-1R.
INTELSAT 14 will be replacing IS-1R in its same orbital location. Figure 21 is a general
overview of an INTELSAT Earth station configuration.
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Figure 21. INTELSAT Earth Station Configuration Overview [87]

From Figure 21, it is important to focus on the main components, such as the access
routers and the connection to the Internet backbone. These components will be discussed
in a later section on the NOC. However, they are important components to consider in
this vulnerability analysis.
INTELSAT’s Earth station network utilizes secure shell (SSH) and IP security
(IPsec) for securing communications [87]. However, SSH has several vulnerabilities
associated with it that could allow an attack on the network. A malformed protocol
message can cause buffer overflows or denial of service (DoS) in the firewalls and virtual
private networks (VPNs) that are shown in Figure 21. If a VPN is compromised, the
attacker could then gain access to the protected Earth station network [40]. Buffer
overflows involve “data fields overflowing and overwriting memory segments for
executable code,” resulting in an attacker being able to remotely control the VPNs.
Denial of service attacks prevent systems from performing routine operations by flooding
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the systems (VPNs or firewalls) with control messages that can cause them to become
overloaded [49].

4.3.4 Network Access Point Vulnerabilities
As mentioned in the previous chapter, network access points connect SSPs and
user terminals to the Earth station network via wireless network adapters or fiber
connections. A NAP must determine its location and send that information (i.e. its IP
address) to a connecting user terminal. In doing so, the NAP along with the rest of the
network becomes vulnerable to attack. The NAP location information sent to the
connecting user may be intercepted by an attacker who could then use this information to
set up a rogue access point. If an attacker is able to intercept the IP address of the NAP,
then the attacker can send false address resolution protocol (ARP) responses that include
the IP address of the (legitimate) NAP and the media access control (MAC) address of
the attacker’s rogue device to other legitimate user terminals connected to the network.
This will result in the legitimate users updating their ARP tables with the mapping to the
rogue access point (in place of the mapping to the legitimate NAP). All future data
packets sent from these legitimate users will now go to the attacker’s rogue access point
and allow the attacker access to sensitive data and an possibly even an access to corporate
networks from outside the facilities [67]. This access to corporate networks would
require the attacker to install the rogue access point (AP) directly at an active network
port inside the company facility; however passing through physical security at most
companies is not very difficult [69].
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4.3.5 Wireless Network Adapter Vulnerabilities
During normal operations, wireless network adapters (WNAs) receive data
packets indicating new networks are present. If an attacker can gain access to these data
packets and manipulate them, the attacker can trigger an error condition which could
allow the attacker to run programs and access files on the targeted user terminal [53].
Whenever a WNA is active, the user terminal’s operating system automatically will look
for networks the user has connected to in the past. A user terminal could end up
connecting to an attacker’s network without even knowing it. “Suppose the attacker
provides a rogue AP with a common name (such as a default service set identifier (SSID)
of a popular home-office AP, like Linksys)” [139]. Then, a nearby user, who has
connected to a similarly-named AP in the past, may mistake the rogue AP for the
legitimate, similarly-named AP. This could allow an attacker access to sensitive user
data [139]. In the case that a user terminal is already connected to a network, an attacker
can force the user to start searching again for available networks by spoofing IEEE
802.11 disassociation frames from the NAP to which the user is already connected. IEEE
802.11 is a set of standards for wireless local area network computer communication. A
disassociation frame is sent to a user if the AP wishes to terminate the user’s connection.
Upon receiving these disassociation frames, the user terminal would disconnect from the
NAP and start searching for other available nearby networks. The only piece of
information the attacker would need to spoof the 802.11 disassociation frames from the
NAP is the IP address of the NAP. The NAP’s IP address can easily be obtained from
the beacon frames the NAP is required to transmit continuously. The 802.11 beacon
frames are management frames that allow user terminals to establish and maintain
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communications by identifying the presence of APs. The user’s search for other
available nearby (unencrypted) networks will likely resulting in the user joining the
attacker’s AP [50].

4.3.6 NOC Internet Connection Vulnerabilities
The NOC web-based user interface implies a connection to the Internet backbone.
The NOC can be connected to an Internet backbone provider via a fiber connection.
There are several vulnerabilities associated with fiber connections, such as physical
vulnerabilities to breakage and vulnerability to the fibers being cut by attackers.
The NOC’s Internet connection allows user terminals to access network services
remotely. Unfortunately, Internet connections are susceptible to a variety of attacks, such
as: spyware, phishing attempts, viruses, backdoors, Trojan horses, and worms, all of
which could try to slip into the Earth station network through the NOC Internet
connection [109]. Spyware is computer software that is installed on a user’s terminal (or
the network) without the user’s (or network’s) knowledge. Spyware can collect user
information, install unwanted software, change computer settings, and cause Internet
connection problems among other things [148]. Phishing attempts are made to obtain
sensitive information. This information is acquired by the attacker pretending to be a
known or trusted source in order to fool the user (or the network) into sending sensitive
information. A computer virus, like spyware, infects a user terminal (or network) without
the user’s (or network’s) knowledge. A computer virus is capable of copying itself and
spreading from one terminal to another. Computer viruses can delete files, damage
programs, take up computer memory, cause erratic behavior, and even cause the system
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to crash [46]. Backdoors can be put in software either during design or via a virus and
allow the attacker to gain access or even take control over systems. A Trojan horse can
cause just as much damage as viruses, but they do not copy themselves. A Trojan horse
acts as if it is a legitimate program when really it is a destructive one. For instance, a
Trojan horse can fool users into believing that it is anti-virus software when in fact it
actually installs viruses onto the user’s terminal. Worms, like viruses, are able to copy
themselves and spread the copies to other user terminals without the user’s knowledge.
Viruses and worms differ in that worms do not attach themselves to existing programs.
Also, worms generally harm the network by using up bandwidth, while viruses typically
corrupt or modify files on user terminals [46, 47].

4.3.7 NOC Connection to Terrestrial Fiber Network Vulnerabilities
The NOC connection to the terrestrial fiber network has all of the vulnerabilities
associated with the fiber connection that were discussed in the previous section. In
addition, since the NOC connection to the terrestrial fiber network provides user
terminals and Earth stations access to the Internet or to private Intranets, this connection
is susceptible to all of the vulnerabilities associated with Intranet and Internet access.
There are over 5,000 known vulnerabilities to Internet connections and more are
added every day [129]. Some of these vulnerabilities were discussed in the previous
section. In addition, there are variations on the vulnerabilities mentioned in the previous
section, as well as operating system specific vulnerabilities. The important thing to
remember is that Internet connections present a multitude of vulnerabilities, because the
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Internet interconnects people from all across the world, giving access to those that might
be trying to attack U.S. satellite systems.
Since Intranets are private corporate networks and not open to everyone,
connections to Intranets are subject to a different set of vulnerabilities than Internet
connections. For instance, Intranets could be subject to cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
attacks and cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. During a CSRF attack, “the attacker fools
the user into loading a web page that contains a malicious request. The attacker then tries
to steal victims’ identities and privileges to carry out activities such as changing their
passwords to gain entrance to Intranets. Attackers can essentially access prior web
browser sessions and remain logged into any sites that have been accessed by the user to
carry out illicit activities” [80]. On the other hand, during XSS attacks, attackers set up a
malicious webpage to masquerade as a trustworthy website, one that likely will not be
blocked from the company network. This type of attack can lead to session hijacking and
user impersonation, worms, viruses, phishing attacks, and Trojan horses, just to name a
few [73, 80]. If VPNs are offered to allow employees in remote locations to connect to
the company Intranet, the vulnerabilities associated with VPNs may offer another entry
point for attackers to gain access to the private Intranet [80]. These VPN vulnerabilities
will be discussed in the following section. Also, there is a susceptibility to domain name
system (DNS) rebinding attacks in Java which can allow an attacker to bypass the
perimeter firewall and gain access to a corporate Internet. DNS rebinding involves an
attack on code embedded in web pages, such as Java or JavaScript. DNS rebinding
improves the ability of Java (or JavaScript) to infiltrate private Intranets. First, the
attacker must register a domain, which is then added to the DNS server controlled by the
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attacker. The DNS server responds with time to live (TTL) parameter sets. The first
server response has the IP address of the server with the malicious code. The next set of
responses will contain IP addresses from targeted private Intranets. By iterating, the
attacker is able to scan the Intranet or perform other malicious acts [56, 93]. This is just
one example of the vulnerabilities associated with different coding languages being
embedded inside one another. This occurs frequently with web pages, hypertext markup
language (HTML) typically used for web pages is often times embedded with Java,
JavaScript, or Adobe Flash. Flash is used to create animations and incorporate video in
web pages. Java is a programming language used to include the capability of running
secure Java applets in web pages. JavaScript is a scripting language used in web pages
[94].

4.3.8 NOC Access Router Vulnerabilities
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, the NOC access router enables the NOC manager
to allow or deny users access to satellite services. Flaws in this router could allow an
attacker to prevent traffic from entering or leaving the NOC and to interrupt services.
Within routers there are several buffers, including the output buffer which is important
for packet switching. Due to the fact that buffer size is finite, routers are susceptible to
buffer overflow attacks. Since the output buffer can cause queuing delays and packet
loss when it is completely filled, if an attacker continually sends many packets to the
router, they are capable of causing a buffer overflow resulting loss of data packets [22].
The NOC access router may also be susceptible to the same IP packet routing
vulnerabilities as discussed in relation to the IRIS satellite access router in Section 4.2.4.
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In terms of routing protocols, there are several options that can be used for packet
routing. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the main routing protocol used for the
Internet. It works by keeping up-to-date a routing table of the autonomous systems that
are crossed in reaching the destination. An autonomous system is a collection of IP
networks and routers that are controlled by one entity and use a common routing protocol.
BGP is a path vector protocol, which means that the path that routing table updates take
as they are sent across the network are maintained in order that the current network
topology is known to each router and is updated in all routing tables across the network.
BGP Version 4 has been in use since 1994 [26]. Routing Information Protocol (RIP) and
Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP) are both examples of distance
vector routing protocols which use the Bellman-Ford algorithm for determining routing
paths by calculating the direction and distance to any node in the network. Routers using
these protocols must inform neighboring routers of network topology changes
periodically, so that routing tables can be updated. EIGRP is a Cisco proprietary routing
protocol. It minimizes routing instabilities after network topology changes [59]. RIP
enables routers to adapt to a continually changing network topology by sending
information about which networks are reachable by each router and about the distance to
each of those networks from the routers. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) and
Intermediate system to intermediate system (IS-IS) link state routing protocols are now
preferred over RIP [132]. Link state routing protocols also send network topology
information across the network, upon which each routing updates its routing tables to
maintain clear picture of the current network state. Packets are sent via the best path
through the network to the destination which is determined by Dijkstra’s Shortest Path
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algorithm. OSPF does error detection and correction on its own, avoiding the use of
either transmission control protocol (TCP) or user datagram protocol (UDP). OSPF is
generally used in large corporate networks [120]. IS-IS, on the other hand, is typically
used in large service provider networks because it can support more routers than OSPF.
IS-IS does not use IP for transporting routing information [92].
The BGP routing protocol has several vulnerabilities associated with it, to include:
de-aggregation attacks, unauthorized route injection, bogon (or Martian) routes, and
Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks [134]. A de-aggregation attack consists of a misconfigured router flooding the network with BGP routes which caused routing to be
disrupted globally and many routers to crash. The whole network could experience
connectivity issues. Bogon routes are unused or not-widely-publicized routes, typically
for private use. These routes can be hijacked and actively advertised making it possible
for an attacker to redirect traffic to their router instead of the intended destination. In
order to intercept the traffic, the attacker can use a de-aggregation type attack and try to
manipulate the path to their router so that it appears shorter than the path to the legitimate
router. This form of attack can allow traffic eavesdropping or cause DoS [18]. DDoS
attacks involve infecting a multitude of user terminals with viruses that all attack at the
same time [49].
Cisco’s EIGRP is susceptible to ARP DoS attacks as well as Directed DoS attacks.
The ARP DoS attack is accomplished by sending spoofed EIGRP announcements. The
announcements will result in an ARP storm which will take up network capacity while
routers try to contact the announcing router. The Directed DoS attack is possible by
sending forged packets into the network which could cause routers to change their
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routing neighbor relationships. Iterating this attack could cause sustained DoS. Also, if
the attacker is inside the network, the attacker may be able to divert and modify messages
before returning them to the traffic flow [38].
The RIP protocols can enable an attacker to inject routes into the network and
allows the disclosure of routing information [70]. Since RIP has no built-in
authentication, an attacker can masquerade as a legitimate user by causing traffic
intended for the legitimate user to be sent to the attacker instead. As is in the case with
BGP bogon route attacks, an attacker can send false RIP packets announcing the
attacker’s route is the shortest causing subsequent data packets sent out in the network to
be routed through the attacker’s router. The data packets could then be viewed and
modified [115].
OSPF is also susceptible to DoS attacks. These DoS vulnerabilities can stop
traffic from entering a victim’s router [153]. If an attacker is able to change the value of
the “age field” in a legitimate router’s link state advertisement (LSA) to “MaxAge”, then
the attacker could interrupt routing through that legitimate user’s router. The LSA
contains the routing information for the particular router disseminating it. MaxAge is
used to eliminate old LSA’s from the distributed database. By changing the age field to
almost the MaxAge, the LSA would age prematurely causing it to be deleted from the
database prematurely. If two LSA ages are within a “MaxAgeDiff” window, OSPF will
call them equal. The false LSA could replace the legitimate LSA and cause it to be
eliminated prematurely from the database. This would only happen if the legitimate LSA
was also in the MaxAgeDiff window. MaxAgeDiff is defined as one quarter of MaxAge
and one half of the normal refresh interval. There is no way to protect against routers in
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the network announcing false information about their own links, such as announcing a
connection that does not exist. These false announcements could result in this internal
router receiving data packets that are bound for the network to which it announces the
false connection. The packets would not reach their destination, unless the router passed
on the data packets to their correct destination network [19].
IS-IS is widely used by network operators due to the fact that it runs over open
systems interconnection (OSI) Layer 2 (Data Link layer) protocols and disturbances on
the IP Layer (Network layer, Layer 3). Attacks like DDoS attacks do not have an effect
on IS-IS [7]. Data link layer protocols include PPP and LAPB.
In summary, routing protocols were not designed to protect against insertion and
propagation of false routing information. The capability exists for attackers to modify,
delete, replay, or generate false routing information and send it propagating through the
network. If an attacker announces that their route is the shortest route to many networks,
they can cause congestion and increase the load on the network. Also, by injecting
incorrect routing information into the network, an attacker can make areas of the network
seem unreachable, when in fact they are actually reachable. Also, a router internal to the
network could send incorrect routing information about its own links to the rest of the
network [19]. The least vulnerable of the routing protocols mentioned in this section
seems to be IS-IS.
Since the NOC access router allows (or denies) access to satellite services, the
vulnerabilities associated with those particular services also need to be taken into
consideration. These service vulnerabilities will be discussed in a later section on the
SSP. Since there are a multitude of services that are currently available via satellite, the
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example of INTELSAT 14 will be continued in the discussion of service vulnerabilities,
and only the vulnerabilities associated with the services to be offered by INTELSAT 14
and the IRIS payload will be discussed.

4.3.9 Earth Segment Vulnerabilities Summary
The Earth station network is the most vulnerable component of the satellite
system’s Earth segment. It incorporates all of the vulnerabilities of each Earth station
that is part of the network. In addition, since the NOC is also a part of the Earth station
network, the Earth station network is subject to all NOC vulnerabilities, as well.

4.4 User Segment Vulnerabilities

As mentioned in Section 3.5, the user segment consists of user stations that enable
access to corporate Intranets, the Internet, and cellular networks. Remote users can
connect via the Internet to an SSP to access services. Points of Presence (PoPs) may act
as the “middle man” in providing remote users Internet access via ISPs. Standard PC
devices are also an option for remote users in the case where access to the terrestrial fiber
network is impossible. All of these accesses to various satellite services make the user
segment susceptible to a variety of attacks. Also, connections via SSPs, PoPs, and
standard PC devices may have additional vulnerabilities associated with them. The
vulnerabilities associated with Internet and Intranet access were discussed previously in
Section 4.3.7 and will not be repeated here.
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4.4.1 Cellular Network Access Vulnerabilities
Many of the vulnerabilities associated with cellular network access are due to the
interaction between these cellular networks and the Internet. If these attacks target user
terminals, as opposed to the cellular network, they are usually harder for the network
operators to defend against. An example of one particular attack involves attackers
exploiting multimedia messaging service (MMS) vulnerabilities in order to drain user
terminal batteries. The attack was executed by first creating a list of target user terminals
with active Internet connections. This list was compiled by exploiting the insecurities of
the MMS protocol. Once the target list was created, the attackers could drain the
terminals’ batteries faster than normal by exploiting the packet data protocol (PDP)
context retention. Before a user terminal can use any general packet radio services
(GPRSs), the terminal must be registered with a Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN).
A PDP context is created during this registration procedure. Upon ending a
communication session, the terminal would go into standby mode; however the PDP
context is still allocated to the terminal. This is done to keep from having to deactivate
and reactivate a new PDP context after ending every communication. Deactivating and
reactivating a new PDP context could cause applications to restart and require the user to
re-enter all passwords. Since user cellular terminals will accept any MMS message it
receives as long as the message format is correct, an attacker can send as many MMS
messages to the terminal as they want without alarming the cellular services provider.
Phones reveal information such as: hardware description, display capabilities, and the
current and compatible software whenever they communication over HTTP. An attacker
could easily obtain the terminal model number from this information. In order to build
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the target list, the attacker sends an MMS message with their web server location to the
target terminals, and then waits for HTTP request messages from the terminals to come to
their web server. Since most cellular terminals download MMS messages automatically
upon receipt, the terminals will automatically make HTTP requests, which usually
contain the profiles and IP addresses of the terminals, to the attacker’s web server. Also,
the terminal’s reply to the attacker’s MMS message activates a PDP context, making the
battery draining attack easy to execute. The active PDP enables the attacker to send
extraneous IP packets to the target user terminals to drain their batteries. Since cellular
terminals are usually in standby mode, when a message is received a page on the paging
channel will bring the terminal to the ready state and cause it to perform a location update.
This process causes the terminal to use up battery power [35].
Cellular networks themselves are susceptible to various attacks, including:
worms, eavesdropping, spamming, masquerade attacks (impersonating users and
networks), DoS, man-in-the-middle attacks, and hijacking of services. An attacker could
sending a multitude of messages to many target user terminals in one area and cause DoS
in that area of the network by saturating network control channels which are used for
both voice and short message service (SMS) services. Since cellular network providers
allow email and web-based interfaces to message user terminals directly, a spam attack
combined with a phishing attack could allow an attacker to gain access to users’ sensitive
data. Worms can also be used to attack a cellular network. They can be spread via email
attachments or Bluetooth. Worms can cause DoS attacks or change user terminal
operating systems and then search for other terminals to infect, for example. By
changing the terminal’s operating system, the attacker could drain the terminal’s battery
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by setting the terminal’s transceiver to run continuously at maximum strength [35]. An
attacker can gain entry into the cellular network by exploiting a buffer overflow
vulnerability in dual-mode cellular terminals which enable users to access both cellular
and Wi-Fi services. By exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability in these dual-mode
terminals, an attacker can execute arbitrary code which will enable them to use the
terminals as gateways into the cellular network. Also, these dual-mode phones open the
cellular network up to the vulnerabilities associated with using Wi-Fi services [96].
Since wireless communications are passed through the air, anyone within range is
capable of eavesdropping on or intercepting these communications. All an attacker needs
to eavesdrop wireless communications is a “packet sniffing” program, many of which are
available for free. “Packet sniffing” programs display all data they find being transmitted
in the public WiFi local area network (LAN) [126]. In addition, Wi-Fi networks and
users continue to use the highly vulnerable wireless encryption protocol (WEP) to protect
these communications. WEP headers are not encrypted, so source and destinations
addresses of every packet sent are easily identifiable. Also, since the WEP encryption
key never changes unless manually changed by the network administrator, an
eavesdropping attacker could monitor communications over a period of time and gather
information to enable them to determine the encryption key via statistical analysis and
decrypt the data [111]. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) replaced WEP and provides
better protection for wireless communications. However, WPA is still not completely
secure. WPA uses mathematical algorithms in order to provide authentication of users to
the network. The use of these mathematical algorithms makes WPA vulnerable to attack.
If a legitimate user (or an attacker) sends two unauthorized data packets within one
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second, WPA thinks it is being attacked and shuts down. An attacker can take advantage
of this aspect of WPA by sending unauthorized data packets periodically. This would
cause periodic shutdowns of WPA [68].
Wi-Fi networks are also vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. If an attacker
can masquerade as a legitimate Wi-Fi network, once legitimate users are connected to the
attacker’s network, the attacker can view, modify, and replay data, inject data, and
impersonate legitimate users all without the users’ knowledge. If the attacker sends the
users’ data on to the legitimate wireless network after it passes through the attacker’s
network, the legitimate user will not notice any change in services [52]. Wi-Fi networks
are susceptible to malicious software, such as viruses, worms, and Trojan horses, as are
all networks connecting to the Internet. They are also subject to DoS attacks which can
be implemented on Wi-Fi networks to overwhelm legitimate network signals by
introducing a strong interfering signal or by flooding a NAP by exploiting the IEEE
802.11 medium arbitration algorithm which is supposed to prevent users from trying to
send signals at the same time [125]. The attacker would need a powerful transmitter and
would need to be located somewhere nearby to introduce a sufficiently strong interfering
signal into the network to cause DoS. This would make locating the attacker relatively
easy. In the case of the network flooding attack, the attacker will use up available
bandwidth and cause DoS to legitimate users. In addition, Wi-Fi networks are
susceptible to ARP spoofing as discussed previously in Section 4.3.4 as well as hijacking,
phishing, and man-in-the-middle attacks as discussed in Section 4.2.4, Section 4.3.6, and
Section 4.4.1, respectively.
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4.4.2 Satellite Service Provider (SSP) Connection Vulnerabilities
SSPs offer satellite services to remote users via the network of ground- and spacebased infrastructure. Users connect to SSPs via the Internet. Therefore, SSPs are
susceptible to the vulnerabilities of Internet connections as discussed in Section 4.3.6.
Also, SSPs operate the hub Earth stations for VSAT networks. Therefore, SSPs are
subject to the vulnerabilities discussed in Section 4.3.2 relating to VSAT central hubs.
Since SSPs provide satellite services to users, SSPs are susceptible to all the
vulnerabilities associated with these services, as well. The services offered are specific to
the satellite under consideration. In this case, the example of INTELSAT 14 and the
IRIS payload will be continued and the vulnerabilities of the services to be offered by this
satellite’s payloads will be analyzed.
The IRIS payload is intended to be capable of providing ad hoc networking; voice
over IP (VoIP) services; virtual private network (VPN) services; video teleconferencing
services; bandwidth on demand; voice, video, and data transmission services; and crossbeam, cross-band, and multicast information services without the use of an Earth station
relay. Therefore, the IRIS payload (and INTELSAT 14 satellite) may be susceptible to
the vulnerabilities associated with each of these services.
Ad hoc networking is vulnerable to a multitude of routing attacks, such as
spoofing routing information, altering routing information, replaying routing information,
selective forwarding, and sinkhole attacks. These attacks can be performed by dropping,
changing, or injecting packets into the network. Spoofed, altered, and replayed routing
information can cause such effects as generating false error messages, dividing the
network, and increasing end-to-end transmission time. Selective forwarding indicates
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that some messages are always dropped, degrading network services. Sinkhole attacks
force traffic to go through the attacker, enabling the occurrence of other types of attacks
[63].
VoIP phone default settings generally do not include traffic encryption. If VoIP
data is not encrypted, it is relatively easy for an attacker to intercept data, eavesdrop VoIP
calls, and record VoIP calls [12]. VoIP phones are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks
that would cause the phone to crash. An attacker can use the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) to take advantage of the buffer overflow attack enabling the attacker to connect to
the victim’s terminal and view, copy, delete, modify, or steal user files. SIP is a signaling
protocol used to set up and terminate multimedia communications, such as VoIP calls
[78]. Many VoIP phones are susceptible to DoS and DDoS attacks, spam, viruses, ARP
spoofing attacks, packet injection, and VoIP data interception [12, 91, 142]. In addition,
VoIP is vulnerable to call hijacking, malicious call termination, and information spoofing
[142]. Also, since VoIP phones have web-based user interfaces, they are susceptible to
man-in-the-middle attacks. These man-in-the-middle attacks require knowing the victim
terminal’s IP address. In order to obtain this information, the attacker can try guessing,
using an XSS Intranet scanning attack (as discussed in Section 4.3.7), or by doing an
Nmap scan. An Nmap scan is used to make a map of the network by scanning for
terminals and services on the network. Once the IP address is discovered, the attacker
can steal data, gain control over the victim’s VoIP phone, disable the victim’s VoIP
phone, monitor the victim’s use of the VoIP phone, or even eavesdrop the conversations
going on in the victim’s surroundings [72].
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The applications of these VoIP services over INTELSAT satellites include:
interoffice trunking over the Internet or corporate Intranets, business continuity and
disaster recovery, pre-paid calling card services, VoIP peering, Internet cafés, and IP
Central Office Exchange (Centrex) [88]. Some of these applications have additional
vulnerabilities associated with them on top of the VoIP vulnerabilities discussed above.
VoIP peering, or call forwarding between Internet telephony service providers (ITSPs),
decentralizes the call routing which normally involves the use of a central hub. This
decentralization of the routing makes it easier for an attacker to take over a legitimate
user’s number [137]. This application typically uses the session initiation protocol (SIP)
signaling protocol. This protocol has several vulnerabilities associated with it that may
affect the VoIP peering application [99]. For instance, SIP vulnerabilities could allow an
attacker to access a user terminal and cause it to become unstable, cause a DoS attack, or
cause VoIP services to be interrupted [34]. There is a particular vulnerability in SIP
forking proxies that can enable an “exponentially-growing message exchange attack”
which would result in the network being flooded with traffic. SIP forking proxies are
servers that are used to search for correspondents [30]. SIP is also subject to spoofing
attacks. An attacker could send INITIATE requests (to begin a communication session)
with false IP addresses to spoof a legitimate user or send spoofed BYE requests to cause
call termination [140]. In addition, SIP may be vulnerable to eavesdropping, man-in-themiddle attacks, attacks forcing a VoIP phone to reboot, call redirection, and registration
manipulation (erasure or hijacking of a legitimate user’s registration attempt, or addition
of false registrations). In the case of man-in-the-middle attacks, an attacker would inject
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their rogue terminals into the network between proxies [42]. IP Centrex is a businessgrade phone service. It is also susceptible to the aforementioned SIP vulnerabilities [43].
VPN’s are subject to the SSH vulnerabilities previously discussed in Section 4.3.3.
In addition, VPN’s are vulnerable to viruses, man-in-the-middle attacks, hijacking, and
VPN spoofing. Viruses may be passed onto the VPN via a user Internet connection if the
user is connected to both simultaneously. VPN man-in-the-middle attacks can allow an
attacker to intercept, replay, redirect, delete, modify, or insert data as well as reflecting
data back to the sender. VPN hijacking involves an attacker taking over a legitimate
user’s already-initiated VPN connection and masquerading as the legitimate user to the
network [82]. VPN spoofing, if successful, can allow an attacker unauthorized access to
a VPN. The attack is implemented by first creating packets with false IP addresses.
These packets are sent to legitimate users and to make the user think the attacker’s device
is legitimate. The attacker then may be able to alter routing information and obtain
access to authentication sequences. This information may yield unauthorized access to
the VPN for the attacker [36]. IP VPNs are intended to enable a company’s customers
and partners to securely connect to the company’s Intranet and connect the company with
an IP wide area network that can carry voice, video, and data over a single connection
[71]. IP VPNs run over TCP/IP (See Figure 22.).
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Figure 22. IP-VPN over TCP/IP Illustration [85]

TCP/IP is vulnerable to packet sniffing, IP spoofing, and TCP session hijacking,
to name a few. IP spoofing refers to a process in which an attacker creates false packets
with a legitimate user’s IP address, impersonating packets sent by the legitimate user. IP
spoofing can be used cause DoS or to gain unauthorized access to a network [55]. If an
attacker sends a SYN packet with a spoofed IP address to a host in order to request a
connection with the host, then the host will reply to the attacker’s spoofed IP address with
a SYN/ACK packet. The SYN packet is the first packet in a connection indicating that
the attacker wants to create a connection with the host server. The SYN/ACK packet
acknowledges the hosts receipt of the attacker’s SYN packet and sends the host’s SYN
information in return. The attacker then never sends an ACK packet to the host to
acknowledge receipt of the SYN/ACK packet, so the connection request remains on the
stack. The attacker then continues to send SYN packets with the spoofed IP address,
thereby leaving many unanswered connection requests on the stack, using up system
resources and causing DoS. This type of attack is called SYN flooding. Also, TCP/IP is
subject to packet spoofing. An attacker could inject a packet into the network and then
give it a false source IP address. By specifying the route the packet takes through the
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network instead of letting it go through the network routers, the attacker’s packet can be
sent with a spoofed IP address. TCP session hijacking involves the attacker taking over
an already-initiated connection and masquerading as a legitimate user. This can be done
via a man-in-the-middle attack, for example [141]. The Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) is used in the TCP/IP IP layer to send one-way messages to a host.
ICMP can be used in DoS attacks or allow attackers to intercept packets. An attacker can
send a false “time exceeded” or “destination unreachable” message to a victim causing
the victim to end their connection. The ICMP “redirect” message can be used to intercept
packets. If an attacker sends a false ICMP “redirect” message to a victim, the victim will
then end up sending certain connection packets through the attacker’s device [95].
One of the applications of INTELSAT’s bandwidth on demand services is
maritime communications [89]. Maritime communications depend on the Global
Positioning System (GPS) for timing synchronization. GPS timing is vulnerable to bad
weather and may be lost during severe storms [97]. Also, GPS timing, since it is
provided by the GPS satellites, is susceptible to all of the vulnerabilities associated with
satellites discussed previously in Section 4.2, such as jamming or intentional physical
attack.
The implications of the IRIS payload multicasting information to users are that
user terminals will be subject to the vulnerabilities associated with multicasting. The
nature of multicasting is that anyone can join a multicast group, and when packets are
sent to the multicast group address, all members receive those packets. The
vulnerabilities of multicasting include: DoS attacks, flooding attacks, forged data attacks,
sending of false acknowledgements (ACKs), Scalable Reliable Multicast Protocol
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(SRMP) vulnerabilities, buffer overflows, rushing attacks, neighbor attacks, black hole
attacks, and jellyfish attacks [100, 105, 117]. Flooding attacks involve the attacker
sending many data packets to the multicast group, using up network resources and
degrading services. Since the Reliable Multicast Protocol (RMP) does not verify that a
packet’s network address matches the multicast group identifier, the attacker can send
forged data to the multicast group. An attacker can modify the order of data packets by
sending false ACKs to the multicast group. The SRMP can be manipulated by an
attacker to generate negative ACKs (NAKs). These NAKs can be created by changing
the TTL in the packet header. These NAKs are only received by some of the multicast
group members. If the group members receiving the attacker’s NAKs try to send their
own NAKs, the group members’ NAKs will be blocked, and therefore a retransmission of
the data packets that were not received will not be initiated. In addition, an attacker can
cancel any retransmissions from legitimate multicast group members by creating their
own retransmissions with a shortened TTL [100]. Rushing attacks involve an attacker
entering routing paths between legitimate users. As an intermediate node, the attacker’s
device only processes the first non-duplicated data packet and avoids processing any
duplicate packets sent later. When a legitimate user sends route discovery packets into
the network in order to determine the best route to the desired destination for their
packets, the attacker’s device can quickly forward these route discovery packets. The
attacker’s device then gains priority when routing paths are being selected by legitimate
users, increasing the chances of a user’s packets passing through the attacker’s device on
their way to their final destination. If instead of forwarding the route discovery packets,
the attacker replays them without updating their routing information, this is termed a
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neighbor attack. When the attacker replays the route discovery packets, it can cause two
users that are not within range of each other to think that they are neighbors. These two
users then will try to directly send packets to each other, resulting in the packets being
lost. If instead of forwarding the route discovery packets as in the rushing attack case the
attacker drops some (or all) of the data packets, this is termed a black hole attack. This
type of attack degrades network performance by reducing packet delivery. A jellyfish
attack involves the attacker beginning with a rushing attack, but instead of forwarding the
route discovery packets the attacker delays them and then forwards them. Jellyfish
attacks diminish the ability to provide real-time communications by increasing the endto-end communications delay [117].

4.4.3 Point-of-Presence (PoP) Connection Vulnerabilities
Since PoPs enable remote users to access the Internet, Intranets, and cellular
networks, PoPs subject users to the vulnerabilities associated with Internet, Intranet, and
cellular network access. All of these vulnerabilities were discussed in previous sections
and will not be repeated in this section. PoPs use routers to provide access points through
which user terminals can connect, and these PoP routers can support any of the data link
layer protocols mentioned in Section 3.5.2 in order to provide this access to users. These
PoP routers and the data link layer protocols they support increase the number of
vulnerabilities that a user terminal becomes susceptible to when connecting to satellite
services via a PoP.
HDLC and LAPB are both based on the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) standard Advanced Data Communication Control Procedures (ADCCP) data link
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layer protocol. HDLC, ADCCP, and PPP can all be used to make point-to-point
connections, while the Ethernet data link layer protocol is generally used for local area
networks [5]. HDLC and ADCCP were both precursors to the Ethernet protocol. PPP, or
point-to-point tunneling protocol (PPTP) as it is also known, relies on a single user name
and password for authentication. This user name and password can be easily obtained by
an attacker by monitoring user data packets. The PPP encryption key can also be broken
relatively easily. It is only a 128-bit key and the same key is used at each end of the
transmission [29]. Once the attacker has obtained the user name, password, and
encryption key, they have access to sensitive user data and can even launch a DoS attack
against the PPP server. The vulnerabilities associated with PPP are not due to flaws in
the protocol itself, but are due to flaws in Microsoft’s implementation of the protocol
[136]. The Ethernet protocol utilizes a carrier-sense-multiple access/collision detection
(CSMA/CD) scheme. The CSMA/CD scheme works by instructing users that want to
transmit data that they must wait until other users have finished transmitting. The data
that is transmitted can be seen by all other users on the network, creating a vulnerability
to packet sniffing. The Ethernet protocol is also subject to data collisions. If two users
decide to transmit data at the exact same time, the data will collide. The users then must
wait and retransmit their data at a later time, increasing the end-to-end transmission delay
[61]. If instead an attacker continues to send packets and does not wait until the line is
clear to retransmit, the attacker can cause DoS. Since the Ethernet protocol does not have
built-in authentication, it is also vulnerable to packet spoofing and ARP spoofing (as
discussed in Section 4.3.4) [116].
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PoP routers may be susceptible to such attacks as: IP address spoofing,
unauthorized access, DoS attacks, and buffer overflow attacks. PoP routers may use the
simple network management protocol (SNMP) to support router access control [131].
SNMP is an application layer protocol that is used in the exchanging of management
information between network devices. Cisco Systems, one of the companies
collaborating on the IRIS project, supports SNMP in its router software [39]. SNMP
vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to the PoP router, DoS attacks, buffer
overflow attacks, may cause service interruptions, or may cause the router to become
unstable. SNMP trap messages are sent from user terminals to the network management
system (NMS) and are meant to update the NMS on the state of the user terminal. SNMP
trap messages may notify the NMS of warnings or errors on the user terminal. The NMS
must decode and process the SNMP trap messages from the user terminals. It is this
decoding and processing of SNMP trap messages that makes the SNMP vulnerable to
DoS and buffer overflows. The NMS also sends requests for information to the user
terminals or sends messages to user terminals indicating they need to change their
configuration settings. These messages must be decoded and processed by the user
terminals. The decoding and processing of these SNMP request messages again makes
SNMP vulnerable to DoS and buffer overflows [33]. SNMP uses community strings (i.e.
the community names) to provide some level of authentication for NMS requests.
However, these community strings are in clear text in SNMP messages making them
easily accessible to attackers. If an attacker can access an SNMP community string, the
attacker can gain access to the SNMP Management Information Base (MIB). This
SNMP community string vulnerability may result in DoS or the information gained by
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the attacker through accessing the MIB may allow them to launch further attacks against
the network [149]. In terms of routing protocols, the PoP router may use the BGP or any
of the other routing protocols discussed in Section 4.3.8.

4.4.4 Standard PC Device Connection Vulnerabilities
Remote users can also access satellite services via standard PC devices, as
discussed in Section 3.5.3. The PCMCIA interface ports used to connect the user
terminals to standard PC devices may be susceptible to attack, as well as the PC devices
themselves. Wireless local area network (WLAN) Cardbus devices can be installed in
the PCMCIA ports, enabling a wireless connection from user terminal to PC device.
These WLAN Cardbus adapters use either WEP or WPA encryption [1]. The
vulnerabilities associated with WEP and WPA were discussed in Section 4.4.1. Also,
since PC devices are generally also connected to the Internet, the vulnerabilities
associated with Internet connectivity discussed in Section 4.3.6 apply to these standard
PC device-to-user terminal connections.

4.4.5 User Segment Vulnerabilities Summary
SSPs and PoPs are the most vulnerable components of the user segment. SSPs
not only incorporate all of the vulnerabilities of the satellite services offered by the
particular satellite in question, but they also suffer the vulnerabilities of Internet
connectivity. In addition, since SSPs operate the VSAT central hub, the vulnerabilities
associated with the hubs are included in the SSP vulnerabilities. PoPs, on the other hand,
are susceptible to the vulnerabilities of the PoP routers, the PoP router protocols, Internet
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access, Intranet access, and cellular network access. The offerings provided by each of
these components of the user segment make them vulnerable to a multitude of different
attacks.

4.5 Attacking INTELSAT 14 and the IRIS Payload

The IRIS space system, which is intended to offer IP routing via satellite, will
consist of the IRIS satellite (i.e. INTELSAT 14), IRIS payload operator facilities, and the
IRIS users. The IRIS satellite and payload operator facilities will manage the services
being offered by the IRIS payload and will provide Internet connectivity. Figure 23
illustrates the planned configuration for the IRIS space system.

Figure 23. Illustration of Planned IRIS Space System Configuration [106]
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Note that the Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental, and Multi-National (JIIM) NOC
shown in Figure 23, which will manage IRIS services for JIIM missions, may only be
present in a “virtual sense”. The JIIM users include U.S. Department of Defense air,
maritime, and land forces [106].
The design aspects of the IRIS satellite that make it different from a traditional,
bent-pipe COMSAT are its on-board processing capabilities and the IP router that it will
carry. The IP router will enable the satellite to receive packets directly from user
terminals without the use of an Earth station. Since the IRIS IP router is the new
technology being tested on-board this satellite, it is necessary to examine the possibilities
for attacking this new technology in order that it can be protected. Therefore, the
remainder of this document will focus on attacking the IRIS IP router. In order to
accomplish this feat, an attacker would need to attack the satellite uplink (the
communications link from the Earth to the satellite). If the case of an attack on the
satellite downlink were examined, the signal would have already gone through the
routing process on-board the satellite, and therefore that case will not be discussed here.
According to Figure 23, an attacker would have a few possible options for gaining
access to the satellite uplink. Suppose that the JIIM user is in the midst of a conflict and
is under attack. If the JIIM user is overtaken or captured, then the attackers will likely be
able to gain access to the JIIM user terminal. With access to the JIIM user terminal, the
attackers can pose as a legitimate JIIM user and send signals to the IRIS satellite.
Accessing the JIIM user terminal may require a user name and password. Since the JIIM
users are connected to the Internet via the IRIS spacecraft, packet sniffers may have
revealed the JIIM user’s user name and password prior to the attack making takeover of
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the JIIM user terminal relatively easy. Suppose instead, that the attackers are able to
gain access to the payload operator NOC. Since INTELSAT 14 is a commercial satellite,
the payload operator NOC will likely be a commercial facility, and therefore will not
secured with strong physical security measures. It would likely be relatively easy for an
attacker to gain access to the commercial payload operator NOC. If hackers can gain
access to Johnson Space Center (JSC) as they allegedly did in April 2008 and cause
disruptions on-board the ISS (see Section 4.2.4 for a discussion of this event), then the
IRIS payload operator NOC could be at risk. The JSC hackers used a Trojan horse to
gain access to the satellite uplink after they had gained entry to the facility. Attackers of
the IRIS payload operator NOC could take a similar approach to gain access to the uplink
to the IRIS satellite. An attacker may be able to gain access to the satellite uplink
remotely via the Internet connection provided by the IRIS satellite and the payload
operator NOC. An attacker may be able to install a backdoor onto the JIIM user terminal
by using a virus that is passed to the terminal via the Internet, as discussed previously in
Section 4.3.6. Once the backdoor is in place, the attacker may then be able to take
control over the user terminal, thereby gaining access to the satellite uplink. Again in this
case, a packet sniffer (or phishing attack) used previous to the backdoor attack may be
necessary to gain knowledge of the JIIM user’s user name and password.
Once the attacker has gained access to the satellite uplink, they can send
malicious signals to the satellite that will be passed to the IRIS IP router by way of the
satellite antenna. In the cases where the attackers actually took over the JIIM user
terminal, a session hijacking attack (discussed in Section 4.2.4) may be possible. The
attackers can masquerade as the legitimate JIIM user and possibly intercept sensitive
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communications from other JIIM users. If the attackers instead just send a multitude of
packets to the IRIS IP router, they may cause a buffer overflow. As discussed in Section
4.3.8, this type of attack could cause the router’s output buffer to become full, resulting in
queuing delays, packet loss, and interruption of services. If other JIIM users’ packets are
lost, they may try to retransmit their data, which would only result in further queuing
delays and packet loss. In addition, the routing protocol to be used on the IRIS IP router
will likely be vulnerable to insertion of false routing information. Routing protocols are
not generally designed to protect against the insertion and propagation of false routing
information. The injection and propagation of false routing information in the JIIM user
network could be disastrous especially where real-time communications are needed.
However, the IRIS IP router routing protocol is unknown at this time, and so further
analysis of its exploitation is not possible. In terms of protocols that support router
access control, the IRIS IP router may use SNMP. As discussed in Section 4.4.3, Cisco
Systems uses SNMP in its router software, and Cisco happens to be the company
providing the IP networking software for the IRIS IP router. An attacker with access to
the satellite uplink could send SNMP trap messages to the IRIS IP router, which would
likely result in DoS and buffer overflows.
A knowledgeable attacker, upon gaining access to the satellite uplink, could
wreak havoc on the IRIS satellite network, causing anywhere from denial of services to
interception of sensitive data. Therefore, it is necessary to protect the IRIS space system
components that could allow the attacker to access the satellite uplink. Strong physical
security at the payload operator NOC will be required, as well as protection for user
terminals. User terminal protection needs to include strong anti-virus software that can
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eliminate the possibility of an attacker installing a backdoor onto a user terminal via a
virus.
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V: Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work

The purpose of this research was to provide an understanding of potential
vulnerabilities in satellite communications systems by first identifying various attacker
entry points into a typical system and then determining the specific vulnerabilities at each
identified access point. An attack scenario on the IRIS payload was presented as an
example in order to provide an understanding of the possible impact of attacks on U.S.
satellite communications systems. This thesis attempts to provide a basis for finding
ways to avoid future attacks on U.S. space assets by supplying information on the ways
satellite communications systems can be attacked.
Since satellite communications have become increasingly important in both the
U.S. and in countries across the globe, the protection of space assets will become vital in
order to keep these communications from being disrupted. Satellite communications
have become an important component of the U.S.’s net-centric warfare doctrine.
Therefore, an attack on U.S. space systems could have serious impacts on U.S. war
fighting capabilities. Given that the U.S. relies on commercial COMSAT capacity to
help meet military bandwidth needs, commercial space systems, as well as militarydedicated space systems, are vulnerable to attacks from U.S. adversaries. While military
satellites employ some protection techniques, commercial COMSATs are predominantly
unprotected against attacks such as RF jamming. An understanding of the vulnerabilities
of these systems is required in order to know how to protect these space systems from
future attacks.
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This research determined that the most vulnerable component of the satellite
communications system’s space segment is the satellite antenna. The satellite antenna is
vulnerable to intentional attacks including: RF jamming, spoofing, meaconing, and
deliberate physical attack. RF jamming can cause signal degradation or even total signal
loss. Spoofing is generally only a problem for COMSATs with on-board processing
capabilities. This type of attack can allow the attacker to take control of the satellite
receiver. Meaconing can result in transmission delays. Deliberate physical attack of the
satellite can, of course, result in total loss of communications and likely total loss of the
satellite.
The most vulnerable Earth segment component was found to be the Earth station
network. It is vulnerable to both Earth station and NOC vulnerabilities, to include: RF
jamming, deliberate physical attack, and Internet connection vulnerabilities. Internet
connectivity is susceptible to spyware, phishing attacks, viruses, backdoors, Trojan
horses, worms, session hijacking, and user impersonation, to name a few. In addition, if
an attacker can gain control of the TT&C link, the result may be loss of satellite control.
Also, access router flaws and router protocol vulnerabilities could enable an attacker to
stop traffic from entering or leaving the NOC or enable an attacker to gain access to the
Earth station network, both of which could cause service interruptions to occur.
This research found that the most vulnerable user segment components are the
SSPs and PoPs. SSPs are subject to the vulnerabilities of the services offered, the
vulnerabilities of Internet connectivity (as mentioned in the previous paragraph), and the
vulnerabilities associated with operating the VSAT central hub. VSAT networks
vulnerable to attackers inserting rogue devices into the network which could allow the
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attackers to eavesdrop data being sent to legitimate users. In a star topology VSAT
network, if the central hub is compromised, the entire network is likely at risk, because
all neighboring VSATs are connected to one hub. The vulnerabilities of services were
discussed in terms of the IRIS payload, which is intended to offer such services as: ad
hoc networking, VoIP, VPN, and multicasting. Ad hoc networking is susceptible to
routing attacks which could divide the network and increase end-to-end transmission
times. VoIP is vulnerable to data interception, eavesdropping, call recording, phones
being caused to crash, and all of the vulnerabilities associated with Internet connectivity.
VPNs are subject to SSH protocol vulnerabilities, as well as viruses, hijacking, spoofing,
and man-in-the-middle attacks. VPN vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to gain
access to the VPN, cause DoS, and intercept data. Multicasting is vulnerable to several
attacks, including: flooding, black hole, and jellyfish. Flooding attacks and black hole
attacks both can cause degradations of network services. Jellyfish attacks increase endto-end transmission times.
PoPs are subject to Internet (and Intranet) access vulnerabilities, as discussed
previously. Also, PoPs are open to additional vulnerabilities from providing cellular
network access, such as eavesdropping and DoS. PoP routers are vulnerable to attackers
gaining unauthorized access, service interruptions, and router instabilities caused by
SNMP exploitation. In regards to routing protocols, PPP and the Ethernet protocol, for
example, are subject to attackers gaining access to sensitive user data and DoS attacks.
The example presented of the attack on the IRIS payload, showed that the IRIS
spacecraft may be susceptible to session hijacking, buffer overflow attacks, and
exploitation of SNMP vulnerabilities all due to the IP router on-board. Session hijacking
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could allow interception of sensitive communications, while buffer overflow attacks and
exploitation of SNMP vulnerabilities could result in service interruption or complete
denial of services. All of these attacks can occur only after the attackers gain access to
the satellite uplink.
There remain many possibilities for future work on the topic of satellite
communications system vulnerabilities, and in particular the IRIS system. For example,
once the IRIS IP routing protocol becomes known, further vulnerability analysis may
reveal additional vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit. Also, it would be
beneficial to model and simulate the results for one of the possible IRIS system attacks in
order to verify that it is indeed possible and provide some insight on ways to protect
against this type of attack.
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